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Comment
Oyez, Oyez, Oyez, the King’s Court Is Now in
Session
Kelly Kearney*
King v. Burwell—the decision that sparked interpretive pandemonium
surrounding the meaning of four simple words—symbolized that the
United States Supreme Court, albeit the highest court in America, may
have more power than originally thought or intended. At the heart of the
King case was the issue of whether the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) authorized federal online insurance markets (i.e.,
Exchanges) to offer subsidized health insurance (“subsidies”) to
individuals that resided in a state without a state-established Exchange.
The ACA provides for these subsidies to be available through Exchanges
“established by the State.” But the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
promulgated a rule after the enactment of the ACA that clarified that such
subsidies would be available on all Exchanges, regardless of whether
they were state or federally established. So, whose interpretation was
correct? Normally, the options would be Congress—the drafters of the
legislation—or the IRS—the agency to whose opinion could be deferred
in the face of ambiguous statutory text. But King provides a new, third
option: the Supreme Court’s own interpretation of the law. Thus, the
Court granted subsidies for all—holding the statutory language,
“established by the State,” to mean “and the federal government, too”—
and simultaneously established the precedent that words might not have
the plain meaning they facially appear to have.

* J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
King v. Burwell represented a transformation. King not only
transformed the United States healthcare delivery system by permitting
what appeared to be across-the-board access to subsidized healthcare, but
it transformed the judiciary’s role as an interpreter to potentially a
lawmaker.1 While proponents of a national healthcare system considered
King a success story,2 staunch defenders of the separation of powers
doctrine could view King as the case that permitted the judicial branch to
construe statutory language with undeniable (and perhaps unwarranted)
ease.3 The manner in which the United States Supreme Court decided
King potentially set a risky precedent, and the case illustrates the power
of the Supreme Court to supersede other branches of government.4 King
might have preserved consistent access to healthcare, but its deviation
from the clear textual meaning of the statutory language poses a challenge
to judicial consistency.5
King focused on a primary provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).6 In the foregoing case, the Supreme Court

1. See Judicial Watch Statement on Supreme Court’s Ruling in King v. Burwell, JUD. WATCH
(June 25, 2015), http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/scotus-king-v-burwell/
(noting the statement of Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton: “No federal judge has the power to
rewrite the law, which is what the majority did today in [King v.] Burwell. Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan took part
in an unconstitutional power grab every bit as unlawful as President Obama’s rewrite of
Obamacare. None of these justices have the constitutional power to rewrite major components of
Obamacare in order to ‘save it’”).
2. See Jeff John Roberts, In Big Win for Obama, Supreme Court Upholds Health Care
Subsidies, FORTUNE (June 25, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/25/in-big-win-forobama-supreme-court-upholds-health-care-subsidies/ (explaining that if the Supreme Court had
accepted the petitioners’ arguments, millions of American citizens would have become ineligible
for subsidies).
3. Peter Suderman, Supreme Court Upholds Obamacare Subsidies in King v. Burwell,
REASON.COM:
HIT
&
RUN
BLOG
(June
25,
2015,
10:24
AM),
https://reason.com/blog/2015/06/25/supreme-court-upholds-obamacare-subsidie (“Basically, the
Supreme Court, decided they’d rather squint at the law and look at its general shape rather than
bother too much with the plain meaning of the relevant text.”).
4. See Michael Busler, Supreme Court Obamacare Ruling Sets Dangerous Precedent,
COMMUNITIES
DIGITAL
NEWS:
BUS.
&
MONEY
(June
25,
2015),
http://www.commdiginews.com/business-2/supreme-court-obamacare-ruling-sets-dangerousprecedent-43867/ (describing how legal solutions are often found in precedent and analogy, but
that King implies that clear language can be ignored in the name of congressional intent, making
the legal language irrelevant to a court that has other goals in mind).
5. See supra text accompanying note 4 (noting how King skips the normal process of reading
language with clear definitions in mind, and moves to discerning meaning through perceived
intent).
6. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015).
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examined the ACA’s requirement for health insurance marketplaces.7
The ACA mandated the establishment of an American Health Benefit
Exchange (“Exchange”) in each state to serve as an online marketplace
that would allow American citizens to shop for and purchase health
insurance plans.8 If the state failed to construct such an Exchange, the
federal government, through the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(the “Secretary”), would theoretically “step in” and provide the Exchange
for that state.9
The government relied on the idea that if healthcare is affordable, then
all Americans would want to purchase it (or at least would not actively
oppose the mandate to do so), but not everyone subscribed to this
notion.10 A closer examination of the ACA’s text revealed that
subsidized (i.e., affordable) healthcare was only available on an
Exchange “established by the State.”11 The Exchanges established in a
state, but by the federal government because of a state’s inaction, were,
pursuant to the statute’s plain language, not authorized to offer federal
subsidies.12 Thus began the battle of semantics now known as King v.
Burwell.13
7. See id. (“The issue in this case is whether the Act’s tax credits are available in States that
have a Federal Exchange rather than a State Exchange.”).
8. Id.; see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2010)
(requiring that each state establish an American Health Benefit Exchange that facilitates the
purchase of qualified health plans).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (2010) (outlining the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services in establishing an Exchange within states that fail to establish a
state-run Exchange); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483 (noting the majority opinion by Chief Justice John
Roberts that states: “If a State chooses not to follow the directive in Section 18031 to establish an
Exchange, the Act tells the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish “such
Exchange””).
10. Jon Healey, Will States Create Health Insurance Exchanges After King vs. Burwell, L.A.
TIMES (June 25, 2015, 4:47 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-will-statescreate-health-insurance-exchanges-after-king-vs-burwell-20150625-story.html (discussing how
thirty-four states failed to set up health insurance Exchanges after this provision of the ACA was
enacted because their “Republican-dominated governments didn’t want to do anything that might
sustain Obamacare”).
11. Jonathan H. Adler, On the Origins of ‘Established by the State’ in the Affordable Care Act,
WASH.
POST:
THE
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(May
26,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/26/on-the-origins-ofestablished-by-the-state-in-the-affordable-care-act/?utm_term=.3c59f103178d (discussing how
the drafters of the ACA did not include language that expressly authorized federally established
Exchanges to offer subsidies to its purchasers). See also 42 U.S.C. § 18041(f)(3)(A) (discussing
that a “State may elect to authorize an Exchange established by the State”).
12. Adler, supra note 11 (discussing whether the failure of the ACA drafters to include
particular language authorizing federally established Exchanges was a drafting error, or whether it
was their intention to limit the subsidized health insurance to state-established Exchanges).
13. King, 135 S. Ct. 2480.
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This Article examines how and why the majority in King appeared to
disregard strict textual interpretation of the legislation, and instead
contrived its own perspective of congressional intent when it analyzed
the meaning of, and any ambiguity in, “an Exchange established by the
State.”14 In his dissenting opinion, then-Justice Antonin Scalia, noted
that the response to the issue of who can establish an Exchange in a state
should have been clear: an Exchange established by the state is not an
Exchange established by the federal government, no matter the
repercussions.15
Further, this Article analyzes the ambiguity that the majority saw, and
that the dissenters refused to see, in the four simple words: “established
by the State.”16 The argument boiled down to: if the statute was read
with its literal, plain meaning of “an Exchange established by the State,”
then only insureds who purchased health insurance from Exchanges
established by the state were eligible for these tax credits. Therefore,
those insureds who purchased insurance from an Exchange established
by the federal government would not be eligible for tax credits within
their states.17
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a background of the
ACA and the role of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in its textual
interpretation. Part I then discusses the significance of textual
commitment to statutory language and congressional intent, leading to
what prompted King. Next, this Article discusses King in depth by
14. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(3)(A); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Trying to
make its judge-empowering approach seem respectful of congressional authority, the Court asserts
that its decision merely ensures that the Affordable Care Act operates the way Congress ‘meant [it]
to operate.’”).
15. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496–507 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Petitioners at 11,
King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Brief] (“As statutory construction cases
go, this one is extraordinarily straightforward. There is no legitimate way to construe the phrase
‘an Exchange established by the State under section 1311’ to include one ‘established by [the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)] under section 1321.’”).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(3)(A); see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496–507 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“So
saying that an Exchange established by the Federal Government is ‘established by the State’ goes
beyond giving words bizarre meanings; it leaves the limiting phrase ‘by the State’ with no operative
effect at all.”); see also id. at 2483 (“One type of Exchange would help make insurance more
affordable by providing billions of dollars to the States’ citizens; the other type of Exchange would
not.”).
17. Id. at 2483; see also Richard Lempert, King v. Burwell: Roberts Court Is Clear on
Obamacare
Ambiguity,
BROOKINGS:
BLOG
(June
26,
2015,
9:15
AM),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/06/26-king-v-burwell-ambiguity-lempert
(“[The late Justice Scalia] correctly claimed that read literally, the ACA limited subsidies to
insurance bought through state-established [E]xchanges. Those who purchased insurance through
the federal [E]xchange were from the dissent’s perspective out of luck.”).
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explaining how the Supreme Court acquired the case in the first place,
and describing both the petitioners’ and respondents’ arguments. Part II
concludes by comparing and discussing the majority opinion and the late
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. Then, Part III analyzes whether
ambiguous language was actually present in the statute, and whether
alternative solutions and treatments were available if the Supreme Court
found in favor of the petitioners. Last, Part IV discusses the impact that
King has on legislative and judicial interpretation, as well as the
conversation this case sparked within the general public as a result of
then-Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.
King has been described as a “big win” for proponents of national
health insurance in America.18 Affordable and accessible health
insurance is arguably a good outcome, but it came at a cost.19 This Article
contends that the wrong branch decided this healthcare “win” (i.e., the
judiciary rather than the legislature), and analyzes how King set a risky
precedent for the power of judiciary and its interpretive authority moving
forward.20
I. BACKGROUND
A. The ACA and Health Insurance Exchanges
The ACA is fundamentally made up of three prongs: (1) the
affordability of health insurance by offering refundable tax credits 21 to
those individuals whose incomes fall between 100 to 400 percent of the
federal poverty level;22 (2) the guaranteed issue and community rating
18. Roberts, supra note 2.
19. Id.; see, e.g., How King v. Burwell Could Affect Health Insurance Under Obamacare,
FAMILIES USA: RES. & PUBLICATIONS (May 2015), http://familiesusa.org/product/how-king-vburwell-could-affect-health-insurance-under-obamacare (anticipating the effects of different King
outcomes, and how a win for the petitioners would have meant that millions of Americans would
have be unable to afford the cost of health insurance).
20. Busler, supra note 4; Roberts, supra note 2.
21. Refundable Credit for Coverage Under a Qualified Health Plan, 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a) (2011)
(“In the case of an applicable taxpayer, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed
by this subtitle . . . an amount equal to the premium assistance credit amount.”).
22. A brief outline of the three prongs of the Affordable Care Act:
The Affordable Care Act adopts a version of the three key reforms that made the
Massachusetts system successful. First, the Act adopts the guaranteed issue and
community rating requirements. Second, the Act generally requires individuals to
maintain health insurance coverage or make a payment to the IRS, unless the cost of
buying insurance would exceed eight percent of that individual’s income. And third, the
Act seeks to make insurance more affordable by giving refundable tax credits to
individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal
poverty line.
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requirements, which ensure that the eligibility and cost of a health plan
are not dependent on a potential insured’s preexisting conditions or health
status;23 and (3) the individual mandate that generally requires all
American citizens to either obtain health insurance or pay a tax penalty
to the IRS.
The first prong of the ACA is the offering of refundable tax credits to
ensure access to affordable health care.24 While many Americans are
fortunate enough to receive health insurance from their employers, there
are still many who do not have this option (i.e., those that are selfemployed or unemployed).25 To rectify this difference, the ACA created
Exchanges, or online marketplaces, in each state where people could
access, and then easily obtain, affordable health insurance.26 To ensure
access to affordable health insurance, the ACA offered refundable tax
credits27 to low- and moderate-income individuals who purchased
insurance on the Exchanges.28 Without these tax credits, the cost of
buying insurance would, for many individuals, rise above 8 percent of the
household’s income, and would thus exempt these individuals from the
health insurance coverage requirement—because if paying for health
insurance exceeds 8 percent of household income, purchasing insurance
becomes too costly and is no longer required.29
Though the tax credits ensured general affordability, access to
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2482 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2016) (“It is applying this paragraph uniformly to all employers and
individuals in the group or individual market in the State consistent with applicable State law and
without regard to . . . any health status-related factor relating to such individuals, employees and
dependents.”) (emphasis added); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2704 (2016).
24. See text accompanying notes 21–22 (discussing the first prong of the ACA).
25. ObamaCare and Health Insurance for the Self-Employed, OBAMACARE FACTS: SELFEMPLOYED HEALTH INS., http://obamacarefacts.com/self-employed-health-insurance/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015) (explaining how all American citizens need to obtain minimum essential health
insurance coverage, regardless of whether the individual is self-employed, or pays a tax penalty).
26. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485 (describing a health insurance Exchange as an online marketplace
that allows potential insureds to compare and purchase health insurance plans); see 42 U.S.C. §
18001 (2010) (requiring each state to establish an American Health Benefit Exchange that
“facilitates the purchase of qualified health plans”).
27. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a) (“In the case of an applicable taxpayer, there shall be allowed as a credit
against the tax imposed by this subtitle . . . an amount equal to the premium assistance credit
amount.”).
28. For a brief outline of the three prongs of the Affordable Care Act, see supra note 22.
29. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (2016) (exempting individuals from paying the tax penalty if
the applicable individual’s required contribution to health insurance exceeds eight percent of the
individual’s household income for the taxable year); see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486 (“[T]he coverage
requirement would not work without the tax credits. The reason is that, without the tax credits, the
cost of buying insurance would exceed eight percent of income for a large number of individuals,
which would exempt them from the coverage requirement.”).
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insurance was also important to the ACA. Thus, the second prong of the
ACA identifies the nondiscrimination health status rule.30 This rule
provides that health insurers must offer health insurance at a reasonable
price to everyone and cannot base eligibility or cost of the plan on the
potential insured’s preexisting conditions or health status (that is, if the
potential insured is currently sick or has a history of chronic illness, the
insurance company cannot increase premiums for the insured based on
either of these factors).31
But because insurers are required to offer health plans irrespective of
an insured’s health status, the adverse selection phenomenon becomes a
reality. Adverse selection in health insurance refers to the problem when
health insurance seems more financially attractive to individuals that are
sick, or those that will incur high medical costs, rather than healthy
individuals.32 Adverse selection arises when only sick people (i.e., the
ones who actually need the health insurance) purchase health insurance,
which causes health insurers to raise premiums to account for the fact that
sick, rather than healthy, people are buying insurance.33 As this
phenomenon continues, the cost of insurance rises (for sick and healthy
people alike), which forces the healthy people to wait and buy insurance
only when they absolutely need it.34 This unfortunate cycle results in a
significant amount of people, particularly healthy people, without health
insurance.35
To cure this dilemma, the ACA’s third prong refers to the individual
mandate, which requires most individuals to either obtain health

30. See supra text accompanying note 23 (introducing and identifying the source of the second
prong).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2010); Amy Howe, Court Backs Obama Administration on HealthCare Subsidies: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2015, 12:01 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/court-backs-obama-administration-on-health-care-subsidiesin-plain-english/.
32. Robert H. Frank, For Obamacare to Work, Everyone Must be in, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/business/for-obamacare-to-work-everyone-must-be-in.html.
33. The concept of adverse selection is best described as: “Why buy insurance coverage when
you are healthy, if you can buy the same coverage for the same price when you become ill?” King,
135 S. Ct. at 2484. For more information on adverse selection, see Economics A–Z Terms
Beginning with A, ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z?LETTER=A (last
visited Nov. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Economics A–Z].
34. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484; see Economics A–Z, supra note 33 (defining economic terms).
35. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484 (noting that the Court denied the petitioners’ interpretation of
the ACA because it would create the “death spiral” that Congress intended to prevent); see also
Economics A–Z, supra note 33 (illustrating that adverse selection drives individuals who know they
have a higher risk of a claim than the average of the group to buy insurance, whereas those who
have a below-average risk may decide that the cost of insurance will outweigh its worth).
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insurance or pay a tax penalty. 36 All Americans are now required to
purchase health insurance to hopefully prevent the adverse selection
phenomenon, premium increases, and a subsequent economic death
spiral that could certainly result if only “sick” individuals with high
healthcare costs purchased insurance.37
In 2012, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
challenged the constitutionality of the ACA.38 Specifically, Sebelius
examined the constitutional issues surrounding the individual mandate39
and the Medicaid expansion provisions40 of the ACA.41 In the end, the
Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate, thereby requiring
essentially all American citizens to obtain health insurance or otherwise
pay a tax penalty.42 This decision shed light on the scope of
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (mandating every American citizen, that can afford to purchase
health insurance, to purchase health insurance, or pay a penalty).
37. An insurance death spiral occurs from adverse selection, when not enough young and
healthy people purchase health insurance, which causes health insurers to raise premium rates. For
example, there is a risk that only sick people will make up the pool of insureds, when those people
who do not need health insurance, at that moment, have opted out of it. Thus, a death spiral of only
sick people trying to get health insurance occurs and insurance companies subsequently drive the
cost of insurance higher and higher to cover its sick insureds. For more information, see David
Hogberg, The Obamacare Death Spiral Is Still Coming, FEDERALIST: HEALTH CARE (June 2,
2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/06/02/the-obamacare-death-spiral-is-still-coming/. See also
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484 (“[T]he statutory scheme compels the Court to reject petitioners’
interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with a
Federal Exchange, and likely create the very “death spirals” that Congress designed the Act to
avoid.”).
38. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (challenging
the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate provision). See also Amy Howe, In Plain
English: Is Half a Loaf Better Than No Loaf?, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 28, 2012, 6:55 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/in-plain-english-is-half-a-loaf-better-than-no-loaf/
(illustrating the possible repercussions that will result if the individual mandate is struck down in
Sebelius).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (laying out the requirements under Title 1, providing that if an
American citizen is able to purchase health insurance, he or she must do so or pay a penalty
[hereinafter the “individual mandate”]); see also Summary of Provisions in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/summary-ofprovisions-patient-protection-and-affordable-care-act/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015) [hereinafter
Summary of ACA Provisions] (summarizing the provisions of the ACA title by title).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 18083 (2010) (expanding the eligibility requirements for Medicaid); see
also Summary of ACA Provisions, supra note 39 (summarizing the provisions of the ACA title by
title).
41. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (holding that the individual mandate exceeded the power
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause, but was in line with its taxing powers, but finding
that the Medicaid expansion provision exceeded Congress’ power under the Spending Clause); see
also Memorandum from Staff of the Joint Select Comm. on Health Reform Implementation, to
Members of the Joint Select Comm. on Health Reform Implementation (July 25, 2012) [hereinafter
Memorandum] (providing a short summary of Sebelius).
42. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2583; see David B. Kopel, Online symposium: The Bar Review
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congressional power by examining constitutional issues under the
Commerce Clause,43 the Taxing and Spending Clause,44 and the
Necessary and Proper Clause.45
The plaintiffs in Sebelius argued that the individual mandate and the
Medicaid expansion provision exceeded the federal government’s
constitutionally enumerated powers.46 In its response, the federal
government argued that the individual mandate was constitutional
because the foregoing constitutional clauses justified its enactment.47
The Court held that, while the federal government cannot force American
citizens to purchase health insurance under the Commerce Clause or
Necessary and Proper Clause, it does have enumerated powers under the
Taxing and Spending Clause that allow it to enact the individual
mandate.48 Though the Medicaid expansion provision was not a valid
exercise of Congress’ spending power,49 the individual mandate survived
Version of NFIB v. Sebelius, SCOTUSBLOG (July 6, 2012, 5:31 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/online-symposium-the-bar-review-version-of-nfib-vsebelius/ (“The “tax” is low enough so that a person can make a ‘reasonable financial decision’ to
pay the tax instead of doing whatever is being taxed. The tax is not at a ‘prohibitory’ level.”).
43. The Commerce Clause allows the federal government to regulate actions or goods that are
involved in or affect interstate commerce, and prohibits the state governments from doing the same
or interfering. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power “to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes”); see also Kopel,
supra note 42 (explaining how under the Commerce Clause, Congress can regulate
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, channels of interstate commerce, and activities that
substantially affect commerce).
44. The Taxing and Spending Clause grants the federal government power to levy taxes and
spend federal funds. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (giving Congress the power to tax); see also
Kopel, supra note 42 (explaining how under the Spending Clause, Congress can encourage states
to enact certain laws but cannot use it to force or coerce states to enact certain laws).
45. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2583; see Kopel, supra note 42 (explaining how under the Commerce
Clause, Congress can regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce, channels of interstate
commerce, and activities that substantially affect commerce; how Congress has the power to pay
the debts and provide for common welfare of the United states; and how under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Congress has the power to make all laws necessary for carrying into execution the
powers dictated in the Constitution of the United States).
46. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (holding that the individual mandate exceeds the power
granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause); see also Memorandum, supra note 41 (“[T]he
federal government may only pass laws and regulations pursuant its constitutionally enumerated
powers.”).
47. Memorandum, supra note 41; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2572 (explaining that the
individual mandate was not a constitutionally abiding provision under the Commerce Clause and
Necessary and Proper clause, but that it passes constitutional muster under the Spending Clause).
48. Memorandum, supra note 41; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2572 (holding that “[t]he Act
provides that this ‘penalty’ will be paid to the Internal Revenue Service with an individual's taxes,
and ‘shall be assessed and collected in the same manner’ as tax penalties”).
49. Memorandum, supra note 41 (“States that elect to proceed with the Medicaid expansion
would presumably be unaffected by the ruling.”).
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because it was deemed a constitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing
power due to the federal government labeling the consequence of not
purchasing health insurance as a tax.50
While proceedings for Sebelius were ongoing, the Court posed the
question of whether it would be better to just wipe the slate clean and
have Congress start over with this legislation.51 Many viewed the
individual mandate as the prong that, if struck down, would bring the rest
of the ACA down with it.52 Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that
adjusting or striking down another part of the ACA would be a job for
Congress, not for the judiciary—already hinting that this topic might not
be something for the Supreme Court to handle.53 Justice Ruth Ginsburg
agreed, and voiced that Congress would be better suited for determining
which parts of the ACA should stay without the individual mandate.54
Justice Antonin Scalia, in accord with his typical devotion to the
Constitution, argued that if legislators are considering revising the ACA,
they should just scratch the whole legislation and have Congress start
over.55 This next Part demonstrates how the ACA should have had
50. Id.; see also Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (“The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes
on those without health insurance looks like a tax in many respects.”). Further, the Medicaid
expansion issue was addressed with the solution that the federal government can no longer
withdraw existing federal funds for Medicaid from the states that did not choose to comply with
the expansion in the first place—the federal government may incentivize state action, but it cannot
unreasonably coerce it. Memorandum, supra note 41 (“In other words, the Court ruled that states
that do not comply with the Medicaid expansion would only lose the matching funds for the newly
eligible population; existing Medicaid funding would not be affected.”); see also Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. at 2607 (“What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in
that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”).
51. See Howe, supra note 38 (“Although Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg returned to Justice
Sotomayor’s suggestion that Congress was better suited to figure out what parts of the Act should
survive without the mandate (a suggestion with which Kneedler agreed), Justice Scalia again
pushed back. If Congress is going to have to reconsider the Act anyway if the mandate is struck
down, he asked, why shouldn’t it do so on a blank slate?”).
52. See Howe, supra note 31 (discussing, generally, the components of the individual mandate);
see also John Hudson, What Happens If the Individual Mandate Is Struck Down, WIRE (Mar. 27,
2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2012/03/what-happens-if-individual-mandatestruck-down/50415/ (discussing how striking down the individual mandate in Sebelius will bring
the rest of the ACA down with it, because the mandate is meant to expand the pool of insureds, and
without this great variety of insureds, aspects like subsidies for those who cannot afford health
insurance and denying coverage based on pre-existing health conditions are much harder to
sustain).
53. See Howe, supra note 38 (stating that Sotomayor “seemed especially reluctant to strike
down any other part of the ACA if the mandate falls”).
54. See id. (noting that Justice Ginsburg “returned to Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion that
Congress was better suited to figure out what parts of the Act should survive without the mandate”).
55. See id. (“Nor did the Justices appear to relish the prospect of going through the entire 2700plus pages of the ACA, line by line, to determine what provisions should fall with the mandate;
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legislative reworking because textual commitment to the words of the
ACA did not equate to the Supreme Court’s perceived goal of the Act.
B. What it Means to Have Textual Commitment to the Constitution and
Legislation
In 2014, only sixteen states had established Exchanges themselves,
while the remaining thirty-four states had Exchanges established by the
federal government.56 The uncertainty surrounding the language in
section 1401—providing subsidies to Exchanges “established by the
State,”—begs the question of how one is to interpret this provision of the
ACA.57 Courts have approached this question in different ways, one of
indeed, in one of his many laugh lines of the day, Justice Scalia suggested that such a chore would
violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”). In the end, the
individual mandate was upheld, effectively by calling it a tax, which would entail facing a penalty
as part of filing federal tax returns. See generally Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (holding that the
individual mandate exceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, but was deemed
constitutional when labeled as a tax). See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-federation-of-independentbusiness-v-sebelius/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015) (“Although the mandate is not authorized under the
Commerce Clause, it is nonetheless a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Taxing
Clause.”); see also Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Health Care Subsidies, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov.
7, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/court-to-rule-on-health-care-subsidies/
(“The Supreme Court . . . rejected a challenge to the individual mandate, finding that the
arrangement Congress had made was a valid tax scheme. No one absolutely had to buy insurance,
but those who did not would face a penalty as part of their filing of federal tax returns, as the Court
viewed the mandate.”).
56. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (“At this point, 16 States and the District of
Columbia have established their own Exchanges; the other 34 States have elected to have HHS do
so.”); Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9 (“After the IRS announced that taxpayers would be
eligible for subsidies whether or not their states established Exchanges, 34 states declined to create
Exchanges for 2014.”). But see State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2016, HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurancemarketplace-types/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015) (compiling current state legislation and other
insurance marketplace information). Just as the issue was whether the ACA provided subsidies to
federally established Exchanges too, when it stated “established by the State,” one might ask
whether subsidies would be awarded to those that purchase insurance on Exchanges created by a
federal-state partnership (a form of Exchange not contemplated at the ACA’s inception). See
generally Sarah Dash et al., Health Insurance Exchanges and State Decisions, HEALTH AFF. BRIEF
1,
2–3
(July
18,
2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_96.pdf. But Exchanges
created by a federal-state partnership would be subjected to the same scrutiny as Exchanges created
by the federal government.
57. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (discussing how Congress likely would not leave the
interpretation of the ACA’s provisions on tax credits, which is one of the ACA’s key reforms, to
judicial or agency interpretation); see also Abbe Gluck, Symposium: The Grant in King—
Obamacare Subsidies as Textualism’s Big Test, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:48 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium-the-grant-in-king-obamacare-subsidies-astextualisms-big-test/ (“Obamacare’s opponents have depicted the challenges in King v. Burwell,
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which includes a strict textual interpretation.58 Justice Scalia was a big
supporter of this textual approach, and believed that the rule of law ought
to be a law of rules—meaning that the words of the law should, and need
to, govern just what they say they will.59 He believed the Supreme Court
should determine whether a particular case falls in or outside of
historically set rules, not construing these rules altogether.60 Justice
Scalia’s beliefs, as well as other judges’ successful commitments to
textualism, are illustrated throughout the following cases.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 required certain states to establish a
program that would regulate major stationary sources of air pollution and
ensure that these sources met national air quality standards established by
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). 61 The EPA was
challenged regarding whether it could treat all pollution-emitting devices
within the same industry as though they were grouped into a single,
treatable “bubble.”62 The Court in Chevron grappled with the definition
of “stationary source,” and, like King, pondered the idea of giving
deference to the agency (hereinafter, coined “Chevron deference”) and
allowing the EPA to control both the definition and the application of the
Halbig v. Burwell, and the other subsidies cases as the choice between clear statutory text and vague
notions of statutory purpose.”).
58. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
531, 532 (2013) (“[V]irtually all theorists and judges are ‘textualists,’ in the sense that all consider
the text the starting point for statutory interpretation and follow statutory plain meaning if the text
is clear.”). For Justice Antonin Scalia’s classic articulation, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997).
59. See William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1992) (discussing how Justice Scalia has a strong
commitment to statutory text when interpreting a statute); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the “regular method” for interpreting a statute
is, first, to “find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using
established canons of construction, [to] ask whether there is any clear indication that some
permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies”).
60. See Popkin, supra note 59, at 1133 (discussing how Justice Scalia believes that judges
should avoid judicial lawmaking when faced with unclear statutory language, and should instead
adopt clear rules or exercise deference to a qualified agency’s interpretation).
61. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984)
(holding that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulation that allowed states to treat
all pollution-emitting devices as though they were contained within a single bubble-like industrial
grouping was based on a permissible construction of the term “stationary source” construed by the
agency itself); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970) (enacting amendments in 1977 to set new
goals for achieving attainment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards).
62. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840 (“The question presented by these cases is whether [the] EPA’s
decision to allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial
grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’ is based on a reasonable construction
of the statutory term ‘stationary source.’”).
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term in question.63 A significant outcome of this case was that policy
determinations were deemed better suited for legislators or
administrators, not the judiciary.64 The judiciary is the final authority on
statutory construction, and has a duty to reject administrative
constructions that are contrary to the original, clear congressional
intent.65 Statutory construction, as is the judiciary’s role, is not the same
as rewriting the law.66
Another challenge regarding statutory language, specifically in the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“Voting Rights Act”), was presented in
Chisom v. Roemer.67 The Supreme Court took a broad interpretation of
some of the words in the Voting Rights Act, thus straying from a purely
textualist approach, to construe the Voting Rights Act as it saw fit.68
63. See Gluck, supra note 57 (explaining that to give Chevron deference to an agency means to
defer to an agency’s interpretation, and require that the agency’s own construction be reasonable).
Chevron questioned how courts ought to treat a qualified agency’s interpretation of statutes that
mandate that such agency take some sort of action. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. The Supreme Court
in Chevron held that courts should defer to an agency interpretation in the foregoing situation unless
that interpretation is unreasonable. Id.
64. See id. at 864 (arguing that the policy arguments over the EPA’s “bubble concept” are
properly suited to be addressed to legislators or administrators, but not to judges).
65. This case held that Supreme Court Justices ought to be the ones deciding whether a statute
is purporting to say what the plain language of the text says it is:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation [i.e., the Environmental Protection Agency]. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842–43.
66. See id. at 843 n.9 (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction
and must reject administrative constructions that are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”
(internal citation omitted)).
67. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is a significant piece of federal legislation that prohibits
racial discrimination in voting, and greatly impacted American civil rights at the time it was
enacted.
For more information, see NAT’L VOTING RTS. MUSEUM & INST.,
http://nvrmi.com/?page_id=41 (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). See generally Chisom, 501 U.S. 380
(analyzing a challenge by Black registered voters in Louisiana to the system of electing the state’s
Supreme Court Justices, and holding that state judicial elections are included in the statute that
prohibits certain voting or prerequisite qualifications that result in the denial of a right to vote on
account of race or color).
68. Id. at 386 (noting how the terms “voting” and “vote” in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had
broad definitions).
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Justice Scalia, in line with his commitment to the plain meaning of text,
dissented.69 Justice Scalia’s approach to construe statutory language is
to first discern the ordinary meaning of the statutory language in the
context of the rest of the legislation; then, while consulting precedent,
consider whether any other permissible meaning, other than the one
derived from the plain meaning, applies.70 If there is no other clear,
permissible meaning of the text, then Justice Scalia encourages the
application of the ordinary meaning—a concept that should not be lost in
judicial interpretation.71
And again, in New York State Department of Social Services v.
Dublino, the Supreme Court ruled that federal statutes cannot be
interpreted to negate their own purposes.72 In this case, there was a clash
between a New York state law and the federal Social Security Act
(“Act”).73 An amendment to the Act mandated that states adopt a Work
Incentive Program.74 The plaintiffs alleged that New York’s work rules,
which accounted for various conditions for the state’s unemployed
residents, were now preempted by this new provision in the Act.75
69. Arguing for the plain-meaning reading of the text in the Voting Rights Act of 1965:
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is not some all-purpose weapon for wellintentioned judges to wield as they please in the battle against discrimination. It is a
statute. I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of
language in a statute: first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual
context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any
clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies. If
not—and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply
that ordinary meaning.
Id. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419–20 (1973).
73. See id. at 406–07 (presenting the issue in this case as whether the Social Security Act of
1935 prevents a state from requiring its residents to accept employment as a condition for receiving
federal aid to families with dependent children); see also Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301
(1935) (providing for the general welfare by establishing a system of federal benefits and enabling
several states to improve upon provisions for the elderly, blind, dependent and crippled children,
maternal and child welfare, and public health and to compensate the same for unemployment). For
more information on the Social Security Act of 1935, see Social Security Act of 1935, SOC.
SECURITY: LEGIS. HIST., https://www.ssa.gov/history/35act.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
74. Dublino, 413 U.S. at 406–07. For more information on work incentives, see Work
Incentives—General
Information,
SOC.
SECURITY,
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/generalinfo.htm#work (last visited Nov. 7,
2015) (defining “work incentives” as ways to make it possible for disabled persons, who are already
receiving Social Security or Supplemental Security Income, to also work, while still receiving
monthly payments from the job and maintaining eligibility under Medicare or Medicaid).
75. Dublino, 413 U.S. at 407 (reiterating that the issue in the case is whether the Work Incentive
Program, a federal program under the Social Security Act, preempts New York’s own laws
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Dublino highlighted the importance of allowing state governments
considerable latitude in reaching their own resolutions, while also
cooperating with the federal government.76 Dublino also emphasized the
need to preserve legislative interpretation in the legislative branch, unless
there are clear indications that the legislation is undergoing grave
misunderstandings.77
In Crandon v. United States, the majority opinion also emphasized a
literal reading of the statutory provision in question.78 In this case, five
executives from the Boeing Company, Inc. (“Boeing”), resigned or took
early retirement before taking a new job with the government.79 Boeing
made a payment to each executive, intending to mitigate the expected
financial loss of the employment position change.80 The issue in
Crandon was whether these payments violated the Criminal Code when
the Code appears to specifically prohibit this sort of compensation.81 The
Court held that, to accurately discern a statute’s meaning, it needed to
look at the particular statutory language along with its design, object, and
policy.82
Interestingly, Attorney General Kennedy explained that one of the
purposes of the legislation at issue in Crandon was to assist the
government in obtaining temporary services from people who had the
requisite, specialized qualifications.83 His prediction was that this would
concerning its residents’ welfare).
76. See id. at 413 (explaining how federal government interference could significantly impair
the capacity of the state government to effectively handle its own welfare issues, and arguing that,
as long as states are cooperating with the federal government toward a similar, beneficial goal, the
Supreme Court should not interfere with what is already working, and the state governments should
be allowed this kind of latitude in solving their own resolutions); see also Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970) (discussing how statutory analysis must begin with an acknowledgment
of how federal laws generally give states great latitude in how it dispenses its federal funds).
77. See Dublino, 413 U.S. at 421 (suggesting that when interpreting statutory language, one
should follow the construction by those who execute the statute unless there are clear indications
that it is blatantly wrong).
78. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 159 (1990).
79. See id. at 154–55 (describing the background of Crandon).
80. Id. at 154.
81. Id. at 158–59 (describing the standard set forth in the Criminal Code).
82. Id. at 158.
83. President Kennedy explaining the purpose of the statute at issue in Crandon stated:
Such regulation, while setting the highest moral standards, must not impair the ability of
the Government to recruit personnel of the highest quality and capacity. Today’s
Government needs men and women with a broad range of experience, knowledge, and
ability. It needs increasing numbers of people with top-flight executive talent. It needs
hundreds of occasional and intermittent consultants and part-time experts to help deal
with problems of increasing complexity and technical difficulty. In short, we need to
draw upon America’s entire reservoir of talent and skill to help conduct our generation’s
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help expand the pool of talent to better serve the specialized needs of
various departments and agencies.84 But this idea of expansion ran
counter to the unforeseen issue raised in Crandon of whether these
employees could receive preemployment payments.85 Because this issue
invoked the Criminal Code, the Rule of Lenity Doctrine applied, meaning
that any ambiguities would be decided in favor of the plaintiffs.86 The
Supreme Court reasoned, however, that it is not the judiciary’s role to
approve or disapprove the actual payment—instead, it needs only to
ensure that a literal reading of the statute is consistent with the policies
that motivated its enactment.87 To do this, the Court’s function is to
check that its reading of the statute aligns with the “spirit and purpose”
of the legislation.88 It determined that this harmony was present, and thus
ruled that the preemployment payments were not an example of a
departure from what the statute encompassed.89
Additionally, Caminetti v. United States was one of the first cases to
describe a “plain meaning rule”—where statutory intent is read within the
confines of the words in the statute.90 The Court found that the judiciary
must first look for the meaning of a statute within the actual statute

most important business—the public business.
Id. at 166–67 (quoting President Kennedy).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 167 (explaining that the expansion of the statute to encompass these pre-employment
payments would be inconsistent with the goal of the statute altogether).
86. Id. at 175 (“Even if one does not think that a meaning trumps an implication, at most we
have an ambiguity—and since this is a criminal statute, the rule of lenity demands that it be resolved
in favor of the more narrow criminal liability.”).
87. Describing the judiciary’s role in reading legislation:
It is not our function to express either approval or disapproval of this kind of
unconditional severance payment. We note only that a literal reading of the statute—
which places a pre-Government service severance payment outside of the coverage of
section 209(a)—is consistent with one of the policies that motivated the enactment of
the statute. Because the language Congress used in section 209(a) is thus in “harmony
with what is thought to be the spirit and purpose of the act,” this case presents none of
the “rare and exceptional circumstances” that may justify a departure from statutory
language.
Id. at 168.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. A description of the “plain meaning rule” according to Caminetti v. United States:
[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which
the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority
of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
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itself.91 If the statutory language is deemed plain and clear, and if the law
is constitutional and enacted within the legislative body’s authority, then
the sole purpose of the judiciary is to enforce the legislation as it is
written.92
This plain meaning rule is especially appropriate when the statutory
text is unambiguous, and when it invokes only one true meaning.93 In
Caminetti, the statute specifically stated that it was an offense to transport
a female for the purpose of prostitution.94 There is a presumption to read
statutory words as uniform and with the ordinary and usual meaning
typically attributed to them, unless there is an obvious ambiguity.95
Because the petitioner’s action of transporting, or causing to be
transported, women across state lines for an immoral purpose was clearly
against the intended purpose of the statute, his actions fairly fell within
the legal grasps of the statute.96 Moreover, the petitioner was not merely
going against the implied meaning of the statute, but the Court adopted
the plain, literal meaning of the statutory words, and the petitioner was
thus liable for defying its clear, intended, and explicit purposes.97
Further, the D.C. Circuit Court in Halbig v. Burwell also shed light on
the power of the judiciary.98 Despite being vacated and held in abeyance,
the reasoning behind this case provides a useful backdrop in
understanding how the Court decided King.99 The concept of textualism
was revisited in Halbig: the legislative history was a source to consult to

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 484–85 (describing the prostitution statute).
95. Id. at 485–86 (“Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears, to be
used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.”).
96. Id. at 486.
97. Id.
98. 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
see Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 10 (explaining how the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to a decision by the Fourth Circuit (ruling in favor of the federal government) and the D.C. Circuit
(ruling in favor of the plaintiffs), causing the D.C. circuit to hold Halbig v. Burwell in abeyance
until the Supreme Court could decide it for themselves); see also Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390,
394 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating the
IRS’s rule that any exchange, whether State-established or HHS established, could offer subsidized
health insurance). Another court, after reviewing the two circuit opinions, found Halbig to be much
more persuasive, and even argued that the federal government’s defense of Chevron deference to
the IRS was condemnable. The court declared the IRS deference as “lead[ing] us down a path
toward Alice’s Wonderland, where up is down and down is up, and words mean anything.”
Oklahoma v. Burwell, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1089 (E.D. Okla. 2014).
99. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 10 (explaining how the Supreme Court granted
certiorari when faced with a division between the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit).
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verify congressional intent.100 But legislative history is not the only
source for this form of evidence, the literal words in the statute should
also warrant purposeful reading.101 The Court has already made it clear
that it will not give effect to the very literal meaning of a statute’s text if,
in doing so, it creates an outcome noticeably far from what Congress
initially (and, arguably, clearly) intended.102
In Halbig, the IRS Rule that allowed tax credits for those who
purchased health insurance on both a state-run and a federally facilitated
health insurance Exchange—just as in King—was challenged.103 The
IRS broadly interpreted section 36B’s application to cover all Exchanges
established under section 1321 of the ACA. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia ruled similarly to the Chevron
case104—where the court gave deference to an agency like the IRS.105
The Halbig Court called these health insurance Exchanges both a
gatekeeper of, and a gateway to, affordable health insurance.106 It
recognized the importance of these Exchanges, and even acknowledged
the genuine similarities of an Exchange established per section 1311 and

100. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 407 (“Legislative history is a means to an end, to be consulted for
evidence of congressional intent.”); see, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019, 1026 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (discussing Chevron deference, and how both the court and the relevant agency must give
deference to the intent of Congress where it is unambiguously expressed, and how the agency
should only be consulted where the statute is silent or ambiguous on a very particular issue).
101. See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 402 (discussing how courts have an obligation to avoid adopting
statutes that provoke absurd results, but that courts do not “disregard statutory text lightly”).
102. See id. (explaining that the Court will not give effect to a statute’s literal meaning if the
statute would become “nonsensical or superfluous” or the outcome would be against perceived
social values in such a way that Congress could not have intended).
103. See id. at 393 (describing how the IRS interpreted section 36B of the Internal Revenue
Code (“IRC”) broadly to authorize subsidies on federally facilitated exchanges); see also supra text
accompanying notes 98–107 (summarizing Halbig).
104. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text (delineating the phrase “Chevron
deference”—where deference is given to a qualified agency to interpret legislative intent). For
more information, see generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (holding that the EPA’s interpretation of the statute was permissible because legislative
history was silent on the issue).
105. See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 393 (“Furthermore, the court held that even if the ACA were
ambiguous, the IRS’s regulation would represent a permissible construction entitled to deference
under Chevron.”); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”).
106. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 394. The Exchanges are gatekeepers because they determine which
health insurance plans will satisfy both state and federal standards, and there are also websites
allowing individuals and employers to enroll in the qualified plans. Id. These Exchanges are also
gateways to health insurance because section 36B allows refundable tax credits (i.e., subsidized
health insurance). Id.
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one established per section 1321 of the ACA.107
The difference in these Exchanges, however, hinges on who
established the Exchange.108 This distinction determines who can, and
who cannot, receive federally subsidized health insurance.109 The
majority opinion cited precedent to illustrate how clearly the D.C. Circuit
Court ought to read the statutory language, arguing that it is a common
presumption that Congress intentionally places language in certain parts
of a statute, and different language in another part.110
Federally facilitated Exchanges are Exchanges established under
section 1321 of the ACA; they are not Exchanges established by the state
under section 1311. The fact that federally facilitated Exchanges do not
fall under section 1311’s provision relating to tax credits demonstrates
that Congress intended to incentivize states to establish Exchanges—this
incentivizing language is only present in the “state section” under
1311.111
C. How is Congressional Intent Discerned?
The most traditional way to determine congressional intent is to follow
the teachings of the D.C. Circuit Court in Halbig, and read the literal text
itself.112 Justice Scalia advocated for this textual originalism, where one
could ascertain the natural meaning of legislation from the governing
text.113 He also rejected judicial speculation about the intent in

107. See id. at 400 (suggesting that, even though the federal government can establish an
Exchange within a state, it does not actually “stand in the state’s shoes” when it does this); see also
42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041 (2010) (distinguishing between a state-established and a federally
established Exchange).
108. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 400 (“The problem confronting the IRS Rule is that subsidies also turn
on a third attribute of Exchanges: who established them.”).
109. See §§ 18031, 18041 (distinguishing between Exchanges established by the state and
established by the federal government).
110. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 400 (“Where Congress uses certain language in one part of a statute
and different language in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally.”
(quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 (2012)).
111. Id. at 416 (“The statutory provision presumes the existence of subsidies and was drafted to
establish a formula for the payment of tax credits, not to impose a significant and substantial
condition on the States.”); see also Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 10 (arguing that Congress
could reasonably expect states not to reject a deal where its residents could receive billions of free
federal funds in order to purchase health insurance).
112. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 402 (“The Constitution assigns the legislative power to Congress, and
Congress alone . . . and legislating often entails compromises that courts must respect.”).
113. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC
(Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scaliagarner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism (explaining how Justice Scalia urges fellow judges to
look for meaning in the governing text and ascribe it the meaning that is borne from its inception).
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congressional drafting and urged fellow judges and justices to provide a
fair reading of all legislation.114 The consultation of legislative history
ought to play a secondary role to the initial read-through of statutory
text.115 Legislative history is not to be used to explain clear text; one can
examine legislative history when the text produces various
understandings, but unless something is clearly at odds with
congressional intent, the text should not lead to a consultation with a
history book.116
D. King v. Burwell and the Unwelcomed Role of the IRS
The dispute in King centered on who could be eligible for the tax
credits provided under the ACA: persons in states with state-operated and
persons in states with federally operated Exchanges, or only persons in
states with state-operated Exchanges. Section 1311 of the ACA affords
states the opportunity to create an Exchange.117 If a state does not elect
to establish an Exchange, section 1321 of the ACA requires the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to “establish and operate such Exchange
within the State.”118 It is undisputed that both states and the federal
government can create Exchanges. But the heart of the King dispute
hinges on section 1401 of the ACA—which created section 36B of the
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”)—and authorized “federal tax credit
subsidies for health insurance coverage that [are] purchased through an
Exchange established by the State under Section 1311 of the ACA.”119
114. See id. (“[L]ook for meaning in the governing text, ascribe to that text the meaning that it
has borne from its inception, and reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’ extra-textually
derived purposes and the desirability of the fair reading’s anticipated consequences.” (citing
generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS (2012)).
115. See id. (“Scalia is a pertinacious critic of [using] legislative history to illuminate statutory
meaning . . . [because] his criticism is that a legislature is a hydra-headed body whose members
may not share a common view of the interpretive issues likely to be engendered by a statute that
they are considering enacting.”).
116. Halbig provides additional information on when, and in what order, history ought to be
consulted:
We begin by clarifying the role the ACA’s legislative history might play in our analysis.
Legislative history is a means to an end, to be consulted for evidence of congressional
intent . . . But legislative history is not the sole, or even the primary, source of such
evidence. Rather, “[t]he most reliable guide to congressional intent is the legislation the
Congress enacted.”
Halbig, 758 F.3d at 407 (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 18031.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 18041.
119. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (emphasis added). The relevant portion of section 1311 regarding
American Health Benefit Exchanges of the ACA states:
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Section 1401 of the ACA states that these tax credits are only available
to people who purchase their health insurance on an Exchange
“established by the State”—which posed the issue of whether the millions
of people who purchased health insurance through an Exchange
established by the federal government were out of luck.120 The IRS
subsequently issued a regulation, interpreting the language of section
1401 of the ACA (“IRS Rule”), and stated that tax credits are available
on “an Exchange.”121 But in the section for definitions of the IRS Rule,
the IRS noted that the word “Exchange” includes an Exchange
“regardless of whether the Exchange is established and operated by a
State . . . or by [the Secretary].”122
The IRS Rule was proposed in 2011, and then promulgated in 2012,
and allowed federal subsidies to be provided to all individuals who
purchased health insurance through an Exchange, regardless of the entity
that established it.123 This meant that an Exchange could be established
by a state under section 1311 of the ACA, or established by the federal
government through the Secretary under section 1321 of the ACA, and
subsidies would still be awarded to the eligible taxpayers.124 The IRS
chose to adopt the definition of an “Exchange,” from the portion of the

Each State shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish an American Health Benefit
Exchange . . . for the State that—
(A) facilitates the purchase of qualified health plans;
(B) provides for the establishment of a Small Business Health Options Program . . .
that is designed to assist qualified employers in the State who are small employers
in facilitating the enrollment of their employees in qualified health plans offered in
the small group market in the State . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)(A)–(B). See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at i (“The question
presented is whether the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) may permissibly promulgate regulations
to extend tax-credit subsidies to coverage purchased through Exchanges established by the federal
government under section 1321 of the ACA.”); see also Michael F. Cannon, Seven Things You
Should Know About the IRS Rule Challenged in King v. Burwell, NAT. REV. (Mar. 4, 2015, 4:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/414809/seven-things-you-should-know-about-irsrule-challenged-king-v-burwell-michael-f (explaining that state-established Exchanges were
originally intended to trigger “tax penalties under the law’s individual and employer mandates”).
120. Howe, supra note 31.
121. 26 CFR § 1.36B–2 (2011).
122. 46 CFR § 155.20 (2015).
123. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (extending the ACA’s subsidies to all exchanges, whether established by
the state or federal government); see Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 5 (suggesting that, perhaps,
the IRS was worried that states would not establish exchanges to purchase health insurance, and
this is why it extended subsidies to all exchanges).
124. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 6 (explaining how the IRS regulations that
extended subsidies to state and federal exchanges contradicted clear text in the ACA legislation);
see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041 (requiring states to establish Exchanges, but providing for the
federal government to establish an Exchange in the state’s failure to do so).
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ACA that discusses the federal government’s responsibility to set up an
Exchange (i.e., section 1321 of the ACA).125 This IRS Rule allowed
states to provide federal subsidies, regardless of which entity set up the
Exchange.126 At first blush, it appears to incorporate a beneficial
concept, but issues regarding federalism and the intrusion by the federal
government to do what states may have done on their own arise.
This move by the IRS removed all incentives for the remaining thirtyfour states to establish state-run Exchanges.127 With the IRS’s
announcement that taxpayers would be granted eligibility for subsidies
whether their states or the federal government established the Exchange,
these remaining states had no inducement to create their own Exchange
to supply their citizens with the same level of tax refunds that they could
retrieve from other states with state-established Exchanges.128 So, state
residents who purchased health insurance through an Exchange
established by the federal government benefited from this plan because
they were able to afford this subsidized health insurance.129 If the IRS
had not “stepped in,” these subsidies would only be granted to insureds
who purchased health insurance through a state-established Exchange,
thus likely increasing the cost of insurance—and probably to an
unaffordable extent—to residents of states with a federally established
and operated Exchange.130 Though an unfortunate consequence, whether
125. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 6 (explaining how the IRS made subsidies
available to anyone who purchased health insurance on an Exchange established by either a state
or the federal government); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (“[Where a state] [f]ail[s] to establish
Exchange . . . the Secretary shall (directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit entity)
establish and operate such Exchange within the State and the Secretary shall take such actions as
are necessary to implement such other requirements.”).
126. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 6 (“[T]he IRS Rule allows subsidies for coverage
purchased through the federal Exchange, known as HealthCare.Gov, rather than just for coverage
purchased through state-run Exchanges.”).
127. See id. at 7 (pointing out how states declined to create health insurance exchanges for 2014
when the IRS made it possible for taxpayers to be eligible for federal subsidies whether the states
in which they reside established an exchange); see also Brief of the Commonwealths of Virginia et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 21–22, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)
(No. 14-114) (discussing the incentives that were given to states in the form of federal funds to be
handed out as subsidies to applicable residents that purchase insurance through a state-run
Exchange).
128. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 7 (describing how states no longer had an incentive
to establish an Exchange).
129. See Ariane de Vogue, How the Supreme Court Could Send Obamacare into a ‘Death
Spiral’, CNN POL. (June 23, 2015, 6:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/18/politics/obamacareaca-supreme-court-exchange-state/ (explaining how health insurance is made affordable through
subsidies, and how many people would likely be uninsured without these subsidies because the cost
of health insurance would be unaffordable).
130. See id. (paraphrasing Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia Burwell’s feelings that
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the avoidance of such consequence is a proper justification to rewrite the
law is still debated.131
Though the ACA’s statutory text appears to limit tax subsidy awards
to those who purchased insurance through a state-established Exchange
under section 1311, King recognizes a definition of an Exchange that
stems from section 1321 of the ACA, which states that an Exchange can
be established by the federal government with the same benefits as one
established by a state.132 The problem is that the two types of
Exchanges—section 1311 (Exchanges established by a state)133 and
section 1321 (Exchanges established by the federal government)134—
were confused, or wrongfully merged, when the IRS exceeded its
authority in offering subsidies under section 36B.135
The issue in King originated when the petitioners, residents of
Virginia—a state with a federally established Exchange—noticed this
very discrepancy between those who could receive subsidies according
to the ACA, and those who could receive subsidies according to the
IRS.136 The Virginia petitioners argued that Congress intended the
limiting language of “established by the State” to incentivize states to
establish Exchanges so that their insureds could receive these
subsidies.137 But this incentive for the states disappears when federally
run Exchanges can provide the exact same benefits to their citizens by

ruling against the IRS rule would cause “massive damage” to the healthcare system and the states,
and how Congress would have to figure out a way to make healthcare affordable again); but see
Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining how valuable it would have been for states to
take action and establish their own exchanges).
131. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do
not think . . . that the avoidance of unhappy consequences is adequate basis for interpreting a
text.”); see also Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9 (“[A]s a result of the IRS Rule, [the
petitioners] will incur some financial cost because they will be forced to buy insurance or pay the
[individual mandate] penalty.” (quoting Pet.App.52a-53a)).
132. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 36 (discussing how the federal government
believes that section 36B subsidies are too important to be conditioned on who established the
exchange); see also King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494 (discussing the federal fallback that the legislation
provides by allowing the federal government to establish an exchange in states that fail to do so).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 18031.
134. Id.
135. Cannon, supra note 119.
136. See de Vogue, supra note 129 (explaining what healthcare Exchanges are, why
“established by the State” is important, and the implications of the holding in King).
137. See id. (discussing how the ACA was designed as an incentive for states to take action);
see also Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 4 (explaining how, given that the Constitution bars the
federal government from forcing states to enact a law, states were then incentivized to take the lead
role in establishing exchanges so that its residents could obtain subsidized healthcare).
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offering subsidies too).138
Additionally, without this incentive, states would not voluntarily create
Exchanges—in part because establishing a health insurance Exchange is
not a quick and easy thing to do.139 Michael Carvin, the leading attorney
for the Virginia petitioners, pointed out that agencies, like the IRS, must
follow the law as it is written.140 In other words, these agencies cannot
“revise it to better achieve what they assume to have been Congress’s
purposes,” even if it seemingly resolves the subsidy award issues.141
Essentially, the residents of Virginia did not want to purchase health
insurance and sought to become the exception to the individual
mandate.142 That is, without subsidies, health insurance is lawfully too
expensive for them to afford, which exempts them from having to
purchase health insurance.143 This concept shocked one of the
138. See de Vogue, supra note 129 (discussing how the limiting language was designed to
encourage states to act); see also Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 16 (“[On]e of the Act’s
principal architects later explained that the point of linking subsidies to state Exchanges was
precisely to politically pressure states by offering the incentive of federal funds for state
residents.”).
139. See Lisa Schencker & Virgil Dickson, Most States Unlikely to Create Insurance Exchanges
to
Save
ACA
Subsidies,
MODERN
HEALTHCARE
(June
6,
2015),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150606/MAGAZINE/306069960 (describing how,
even in states that have governments that want to establish an Exchange, aspects like “fierce
Republic opposition, high costs, logistical hurdles and timing” significantly slow, or even halt, the
process of establishing an Exchange); see also de Vogue, supra note 129 (describing the political
hurdles that states would have to surmount in order to establish the exchange).
140. Michael Carvin specializes in constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act. JONES
DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/macarvin/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
141. See de Vogue, supra note 129 (“‘If the rule of law means anything,’ Carvin argued in court
papers, ‘it is that text is not infinitely malleable, and that agencies must follow the law as written—
not revise it to ‘better achieve’ what they assume to have been Congress’s purposes.’” (quoting
Michael Carvin)).
142. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (2012) (outlining the individual mandate exemptions). There
are a few exemptions to the ACA’s individual mandate. If the lowest-priced coverage available to
an individual costs more than 8.05 percent of the individual’s household income, then that
individual qualifies for the income-related exemption to the individual mandate and does not need
to purchase health insurance through an exchange. For more information, see 2015 Tax Year
Exemptions from the Fee for Not Having Health Coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV: INDIVIDUALS &
FAMILIES, https://www.healthcare.gov/fees-exemptions/exemptions-from-the-fee/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015). See also Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 8 (discussing which individuals are
allowed to be exempt from the individual mandate).
143. See de Vogue, supra note 129 (“If millions of American [sic] were to lose the tax subsidies
and as a result not buy insurance, it would cause premiums to skyrocket in the individual market
because there would be less healthy people in the pool.”); see also Petitioners’ Brief, supra note
15, at 8–9 (discussing how health insurance would lawfully be too expensive to afford where federal
subsidies are not provided, and how the petitioners “do not want to comply with the individual
mandate, and, given their low incomes, would not be subject to penalties for failing to do so, but
for the IRS Rule” that allows for subsidized healthcare on both Exchanges).
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respondents, Sylvia Burwell of the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”), who argued that if millions of American insureds were
to lose out on the tax subsidies they received to buy insurance on federally
established Exchanges, healthy people would drop out of the market,
individuals would wait until they got sick to purchase health insurance,
and insurance premiums would skyrocket.144 So, whose interpretation is
correct? And who should decide? Enter: King v. Burwell.
II. DISCUSSION
Part II first discusses the issue of the IRS Rule in interpreting the
ACA.145 It then discusses and explains the pertinent facts and rationale
of the petitioners’ arguments in King,146 the majority’s opinion,147 and
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion.148
A. The Issue that Prompted the Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari to
King v. Burwell
The issue in King was whether the subsidies, as described in the ACA,
were available to states that rejected the opportunity to create a stateestablished Exchange, and instead had a federally established Exchange
established in their state.149 The tax credits that caused the issue were
borne from the IRS Rule, and allowed qualified taxpayers who purchased
health insurance through an Exchange—whether it was established in that
state by the state, or in that state, but by the federal government—to
receive subsidized healthcare if their household incomes fell between 100
and 400 percent of the federal poverty line.150

144. See de Vogue, supra note 129 (explaining how a pool of sick applicants would significantly
increase the cost of insurance, thereby creating the very insurance death spiral that the federal
government wanted to avoid).
145. See infra Part II(A) (discussing the issue that prompted the Supreme Court’s grant of
certiotari in King).
146. See infra Part II(B) (discussing the petitioners’ and respondents’ arguments in King).
147. See infra Part II(C) (discussing the majority’s opinion in King).
148. See infra Part II(D) (discussing Justice Scalia’s dissent in King).
149. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015) (“This case is about whether the Act’s
interlocking reforms apply equally in each State no matter who establishes the State’s Exchange.
Specifically, the question presented is whether the Act’s tax credits are available in States that have
a Federal Exchange.”). See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9 (explaining how the Virginia
petitioners, residing in a state with a federally established Exchange, did not want to comply with
the individual mandate component of the ACA, and, with their low incomes, would be exempt from
paying the penalty for not purchasing health insurance).
150. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487; see supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining the
exchange at issue and also the effect of the IRS Rule’s section 36B tax credits); see also infra note
179 and accompanying text (same).
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If the Court decided to interpret the ACA to permit subsidized
healthcare on only state-established Exchanges, it could have undermined
the ACA by rendering health insurance unaffordable to many individuals
who had purchased subsidized care on a federally established
Exchange.151 But in the end, the majority held that “established by the
State”—referring to each of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia—is actually an unclear, and even ambiguous, phrase.152 It is
this very notion of ambiguity that distinguished the parties’ arguments.
On one hand, defenders of the ACA contended that the limiting nature
of the words was merely a drafting error and the result of hasty
lawmaking.153 On the other end, challengers of the ACA read the law as
properly limiting the subsidies to state-established Exchanges,
maintaining a deference to, and respect of, Congress’ legislative abilities
(i.e., relying upon the notion that Congress places words in statutes with
a calculated and precise purpose and intention).154 Challengers asserted
that any problematic interpretation of the ACA was not the result of an
alleged ambiguity in the words of the law, but rather created by ACA

151. See Howe, supra note 31 (“[T]he Court turned back a challenge to the subsidies that many
people receive to pay for their health insurance, ending a case that had the potential to seriously
undermine the ACA, if not dismantle it altogether.”); see also Matthew Bloch et al., The Health
Care Supreme Court Case: Who Would Be Affected?, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/03/us/potential-impact-of-the-supreme-courtsdecision-on-health-care-subsidies.html?_r=0 (“If the court rule[d] against the Obama
administration in [King], about 6.4 million people could lose their subsidies in 34 states that use
the federal health care marketplace.”).
152. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2491–92 (holding that subsidies will be available on both a state
established and federally established Exchange); see also Howe, supra note 31 (“[T]he Court
agreed with the Obama administration that the subsidies are available for everyone who bought
health insurance through an Exchange, no matter whether that Exchange was created by a state or
the federal government.”).
153. See A. Barton Hinkle, Four Little Words That Could Kill Obamacare, REASON.COM (Nov.
17,
2014),
https://reason.com/archives/2014/11/17/four-little-words-that-could-kill-obamac
(discussing how supporters of the ACA, who want to see the law upheld no matter what, contend
that the failure to specify that Exchanges established by the federal government could also offer
subsidized healthcare was merely a drafting error, and not what Congress meant to do); see also
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (calling the manner in which the ACA was produced a form of “inartful
drafting”).
154. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court has
no license to disregard clear language, and that the only evidence pointing to what Congress
actually intended stems from the precise, clear language of the law, and that the ACA’s terms show
nothing else but that tax credits are available only on state Exchanges).
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supporters155 seeking to uphold the legislation.156 After all, the
petitioners endorsed the notion that an error in predicting a plan’s
effect—as in, the ACA’s Exchange incentives not provoking the state
action Congress foresaw—is not the same as an error in drafting.157
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, answered “no” to those
wondering if individuals who had already purchased health insurance on
a federal Exchange were out of luck.158 He reasoned that, if the Court
takes the most natural meaning of “established by the State,” then tax
credits could not be afforded to individuals on federally established
Exchanges. If this occurred, there would be no qualified individuals on
federal Exchanges, which would be problematic to the majority.159 The
Chief Justice explained that Congress obviously intended for every
155. Defenders of the ACA argue that Congress intended for subsidies to be available on all
exchanges, and that it was merely a drafting error that is causing this issue:
Obamacare’s defenders hotly contest this reading of the law. They say it is simply a
drafting error—a bit of sloppy wording that should have been tidied up before passage,
but wasn’t. They contend Congress clearly intended every eligible citizen to receive
subsidies, so it would be the height of judicial activism for the high court to rule
otherwise based on a glorified typo.
Hinkle, supra note 153.
156. The text of the ACA clearly states that health insurance purchased through federally
established Exchanges were not to be given the same treatment as those Exchanges established by
the state:
The deliberate creation of a separate section to authorize a separate federal entity is not
a drafting error. The repeated and deliberate reference to one section but not another is
not a drafting error. The refusal to grant equal authority to two programs authorized by
two separate sections is not a drafting error. The decision to specifically reference
section X but not section Y in a portion of a law that grants spending or tax authority is
not a drafting error.
Sean Davis, No, Halbig Did Not Gut Obamacare Because of a “Drafting Error”, FEDERALIST
(July 23, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/07/23/no-halbig-did-not-gut-obamacarebecause-of-a-drafting-error/; see also Hinkle, supra note 153 (citing Sean Davis arguing that
the deliberate creation of a separate section to authorize a separate federal entity, the repeated
and deliberate reference to one particular section but not another, and the refusal to grant
authority to two programs are not, in any ways, drafting errors).
157. Ramesh Ponnuru (@RameshPonnuru), TWITTER (July 22, 2014, 10:55 AM),
https://twitter.com/rameshponnuru/status/491597304718450688.
158. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (calling a federal Exchange an Exchange that can still provide
subsidized health insurance to state residents); see also Margot Sanger-Katz, Obamacare, Back at
the Supreme Court: Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 25, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/03/upshot/obamacare-back-at-the-supreme-courtfrequently-asked-questions.html?_r=0 (summarizing King and explaining that the Supreme Court
ruled for the government, which means that subsidies could continue to be distributed in every
state, regardless of the entity that established the Exchange).
159. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490 (“And that’s a problem: If we give the phrase ‘the State that
established the Exchange’ its most natural meaning, there would be no ‘qualified individuals’ on
Federal Exchanges.” (emphasis omitted)); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041 (distinguishing
between a state-established and a federally established Exchange, respectively).
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Exchange to have qualified individuals, and because the ACA had not
textually provided for it, it was the judiciary’s role to do so.160 After all,
he noted, the judiciary’s role in a democracy is to say what the law is.161
Chief Justice Roberts reminded the opposing parties and remaining
justices that the judiciary’s role is not to examine isolated provisions in
legislation, but to construe full statutes in their proper context, while also
maintaining an understanding of the legislative plan.162
The Chief Justice also criticized the manner in which Congress drafted
this legislation, noting that it wrote key parts in a manner far from the
traditional legislative process.163 His critique of Congress’ process
implied a hasty, error-prone manner of legislative drafting that could
have, and supposedly did, lead to unintentionally ambiguous language
that was uncharacteristic of such a significant piece of legislation.164
While the remainder of a statute is typically used to help clarify vague
terms in a specific provision, this reliance is insufficient when the
meaning of the statute is only discerned after it has already been
passed.165
B. The Petitioners’ and Respondents’ Arguments
Because the petitioners were from a state that opted out of establishing
its own Exchange, the federal government was required to create a
160. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490 (explaining that the ACA clearly envisioned that there would
be qualified individuals on all Exchanges because the ACA does require all Exchanges to make
such qualified health plans available to qualified individuals. This is something an Exchange could
not do if there were, obviously, no qualified individuals); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(1)(B)
(requiring Exchanges to consider the interests of their qualified individuals).
161. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (“In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those
chosen by the people. Our role is more confined—‘to say what the law is.’” (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803))).
162. Id. at 2489 (noting that the Court’s duty is “to construe statutes, not isolated provisions,”
and that “in every case [the Court] must respect the role of the Legislature, and take care not to
undo what it has done. A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative
plan” (citation omitted)).
163. Id. at 2492 (“The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of inartful
drafting . . . . Several features of the Act’s passage contributed to that unfortunate reality. Congress
wrote key parts of the Act behind closed doors, rather than through ‘the traditional legislative
process.’”).
164. See Jess Bravin, Unanswered Health Law Question: So Why Was It Written that Way?,
WALL ST. J.: POLITICS (June 25, 2015, 7:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/unanswered-healthlaw-question-so-why-was-it-written-that-way-1435256767 (discussing how Chief Justice Roberts
“chided” lawmakers and staffers for the way the ACA was drafted).
165. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (describing a cartoon in which a senator tells his colleagues
“I admit this new bill is too complicated to understand. We’ll just have to pass it to find out what
it means” (citing Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 545 (1947))).
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federally established Exchange in Virginia in the state’s place.166 But
even though Virginia had a federally established Exchange, the IRS Rule
rendered the petitioners eligible for tax credit subsidies. And because the
cost of health insurance with the tax credits fell below 8 percent of the
petitioners’ household incomes, the provision of tax credits
simultaneously removed them from the exempted category. 167 But the
petitioners did not want to comply with the individual mandate
component of the ACA, no matter how affordable it was made. At that
point, the petitioners had two options, to either: (1) pay for health
insurance; or (2) pay a penalty.168 But, the petitioners did not find either
choice attractive. Therefore, the petitioners argued that tax subsidies
were only available through state-established Exchanges.169 This
argument was available to the petitioners because their incomes were low
enough that, without the subsidized care through tax credits, insurance
would not be “affordable” to them (i.e., their premium would cost more
than 8.16 percent of their income) and they would be exempt from paying
a penalty for failing to acquire health insurance.170
To achieve the petitioners’ abovementioned goal of exemption, the
petitioners made five arguments on behalf of wrongful interference of the
IRS and the federal government.171 The arguments all centered on this
166. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9.
167. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9 (explaining that if health insurance coverage falls
below 8 percent of an individual’s projected income, such individual is discharged from the
exemption); see also text accompanying supra note 35 (exempting individuals from paying the tax
penalty if the applicable individual’s required contribution to health insurance exceeds eight
percent of the individual’s household income for the taxable year).
168. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9 (explaining that as a result of the IRS Rule
granting broad coverage of section 36B, the petitioners will suffer some financial cost, whether it
be from being forced to buy health insurance or paying a penalty); see also supra notes 35–55 and
accompanying text (describing how the individual mandate was deemed constitutional as a tax).
169. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9; see also infra note 180 (noting the petitioners’
argument).
170. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 9; see also supra notes 38–50 and accompanying text
(summarizing Sebelius and explaining the significance of the individual mandate portion of the
ACA). For more information on the individual mandate and the penalties for failing to purchase
health insurance, see generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
171. The petitioners attacked five key points of the respondents’ contention that “established by
the state” essentially means “established by the federal government, too,”: (1) just because the ACA
authorizes the federal government to create an Exchange in the state does not mean that the
Exchange is “established by the state”; (2) telling the federal government to establish an Exchange
in the state does not establish the same kind of Exchange a state can; (3) the notion that the federal
government acts on behalf of a state that declines to establish an Exchange is irrelevant to the
argument; (4) confusion over whether the federal government acts under section 1311 or section
1321 of the ACA is proof of why the IRS clarifies that only Exchanges established by the state can
offer subsidized insurance; and (5) Congress could have deemed federal Exchanges to have the
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notion that Congress intentionally, through the ACA, provided for states
to establish Exchanges per section 1311, and a federal fallback provision
per section 1321 if states opted out of this.172 With this perspective, tax
subsidies were intended to be afforded only to state residents who
purchased health insurance “through an Exchange established by the
State under section 1311” of the ACA.173 To the petitioners, this
language made it very clear that subsidies were not available to those who
purchased health insurance through an Exchange established by the
federal government.174
In the petitioners’ first argument, they asserted that simply because the
ACA authorized the federal government to establish Exchanges in a state,
does not equate to such Exchanges being established by that state.175
Second, it was not the type of Exchange that was at issue, but who
established the Exchange.176 An Exchange is an Exchange, but the
subsidies hinged on whether the state was properly incentivized to
establish the Exchange on its own, or if the federal government
theoretically stepped in to do so.177 Third, it was irrelevant that the
same properties as those established by the state, but it chose not to intentionally. For more
information, see Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 12–13; see also Jonathan Keim, The Busy
Reader’s Guide to Amicus Briefs in King v. Burwell, NAT. REV.: BENCH MEMOS (Feb. 26, 2015,
11:17 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/414478/busy-readers-guide-amicusbriefs-king-v-burwell-jonathan-keim.
172. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 11 (describing that though a state can establish an
Exchange and the federal government can establish an Exchange in states that fail to do so,
subsidies are only available through an Exchange established per section 1311 of the ACA (i.e., by
a state), not section 1321 (i.e., by the federal government)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)
(instructing states to establish health insurance Exchanges).
173. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 11; see also 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A) (using the phrase
“an Exchange established by the State under section 1311” twice to distinguish between section
1311 Exchanges and section 1321 Exchanges).
174. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 11 (“As statutory construction cases go, this one is
extraordinarily straightforward. There is no legitimate way to construe the phrase ‘an Exchange
established by the State under section 1311’ to include one ‘established by HHS under section
1321.’”); see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Words no
longer have meaning if an Exchange that is not established by a State is ‘established by the State.’”).
175. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 12 (“[T]he fact that the Act authorizes HHS to establish
Exchanges plainly does not imply that those Exchanges are ‘established by the State.’”); see also
infra notes 180–185 accompanying text (noting that without a financial incentive states are unlikely
to voluntarily establish an exchange).
176. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 12 (explaining that giving instruction to the federal
government to establish an exchange in a state that has opted out of doing so is not an issue of type,
but rather of who establishes the exchange); see also infra notes 180–185 and accompanying text
(noting that without a financial incentive states are unlikely to voluntarily establish an exchange).
177. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 12; see also supra note 171 and accompanying text
(discussing the petitioners’ five key points of contention that “established by the State” essentially
means “established by the federal government, too”).
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federal government was to act on behalf of a state that elected not to
establish an Exchange, as the authority for the federal government to take
that action was conditioned on a state’s refusal to establish its own
Exchange.178 Fourth, the petitioners contended that, if there was any
confusion as to who needed to establish the Exchange for the subsidies to
be triggered, section 36B arguably clarified that it was only stateestablished Exchanges that had that power.179 Last, the petitioners
asserted that Congress could have allowed federally established
Exchanges to issue subsidies if it had wanted to—however, the
petitioners claimed, that was clearly not the case, as it chose to incentivize
states with subsidies for its residents instead.180
According to the petitioners, Congress intended section 1311 to
encourage states to establish Exchanges.181 The petitioners believed it
reasonable that Congress would expect states to not reject a piece of
legislation that provided its residents with billions of dollars to be used
for affordable healthcare.182
These acts of legislation, are not created overnight, but rather built on
a knowledgeable history of legislative and judicial wins and losses.183
The petitioners argued that Congress wanted to politically pressure states
into establishing insurance Exchanges for its residents.184 Further, state
178. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 12; see also supra note 171 and accompanying text
(discussing the petitioners’ five key points of contention that “established by the State” essentially
means “established by the federal government, too”).
179. Section 36B of the IRC is said to clarify which Exchanges are lawfully able to offer
subsidized healthcare and that the provision refers, twice, to Exchanges established by the state
under section 1311 of the ACA. 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)(2)(A), 36B(c)(2)(A)(1). See Petitioners’
Brief, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that the ACA defines “Exchange” under section 1311, and that
section 36B of the IRC clarifies that only Exchanges established by the state can hand out subsidies
to qualified taxpayers); see also supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the petitioners’
five key points of contention that “established by the State” essentially means “established by the
federal government, too”).
180. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 13 (arguing that the federal government’s contention
that Exchanges established by the federal government are the same as those established by the state
is a dogmatic and unproven statement); see also supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing
the petitioners’ five key points of contention that “established by the state” essentially means
“established by the federal government, too”).
181. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 14 (arguing that there is no inconsistency between
Congress wanting subsidized healthcare but also wanting to condition such care on state action,
because inducing states to act is such a valuable component of the ACA).
182. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining how reasonable it is that Congress likely
expected states to not want to pass up on the chance to offer billions of federal dollars to its residents
to purchase healthcare).
183. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014) (reasoning that courts
cannot “revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice”).
184. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 16 (“[O]ne of the Act’s principal architects later

11_KEARNEY_DOCUMENT6 (291-350).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

The King’s Court Is Now in Session

1/3/2017 1:20 PM

323

governments were unlikely to spring into action with this new legislation
without receiving some form of a monetary reward for doing so.185
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the provisions in the
ACA suggested that Congress might not have intended the phrase
“established by the State” to carry the most allegedly natural meaning.186
If this were the case, they contended, it would be in line with the argument
that the legislation was drafted quickly and was prone to errors, like using
“established by the State” in sections that would have benefited from the
hypothetical clarification “and the federal government, too.”187
The respondents argue that subsidies in federally established
Exchanges are necessary to accomplish the overall purpose of the ACA
(i.e., reducing healthcare costs and improving overall access).188 These
subsidies are needed because, without them, insurance market death
spirals would surely result, and it simply looks bad to revoke a promise
of affordable healthcare for all Americans.189 The respondents further

explained that the point of linking subsidies to state Exchanges was precisely to politically pressure
states by offering the incentive of federal funds for state residents.”); see also supra notes 142–143
and accompanying text (discussing the individual mandate exemptions).
185. See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: What Makes a State Exchange?
(Updated),
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(July
28,
2014),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/28/implementing-health-reform-what-makes-a-stateexchange/ (explaining that establishing an Exchange is different from carrying out the daily tasks
of an Exchange and that there are many steps incorporated in establishing such an Exchange); see
also Richard Lempert, In King v. Burwell, an Easy Answer to the ACA’s Definition of “Exchange”,
BROOKINGS:
BLOG
(Mar.
3,
2015,
7:30
PM),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/03/04-king-burwell-aca-exchange-supremecourt-lempert (“The model that the petitioners have of the Congressional mind seems to be one in
which Congress is so sure that states would not want to deprive their citizens of federal subsidies
that the threat of their unavailability would induce them to set up exchanges . . . .”).
186. See Brief for Respondents at 15, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (No. 14114) [hereinafter Respondents’ Brief] (“[T]he definitional and other directly applicable provisions
of the Act—including provisions cross-referenced in Section 36B itself—demonstrate that the Act
treats an Exchange established by HHS in a State’s stead as an Exchange ‘established by the
State.’”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18031, 18041 (2010) (distinguishing between a state-established and
a federally established exchange, respectively); see also King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490 (“These provisions
suggest that the Act may not always use the phrase ‘established by the State’ in its most natural
sense. Thus, the meaning of that phrase may not be as clear as it appears when read out of
context.”).
187. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490 (suggesting that the ACA uses the phrase “established by the
State” in different ways and with different meanings throughout the ACA); see also Respondents’
Brief, supra note 186, at 15 (arguing that the ACA treats a federally established Exchange as an
Exchange established by the state).
188. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 186, at 26; Hatch, infra note 250, at 8–9; see Transcript of
Oral Argument at 44, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) [hereinafter Oral Argument Transcript]
(“[O]ur reading is compelled by the Act’s structure and design.”).
189. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 188, at 44–45.
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supported this contention by adding that this surely could not “be the
statute that Congress intended.”190
C. The Majority Opinion
In the effort to explain how the majority reached the conclusion that it
did, Chief Justice Roberts outlined an opinion that centered on the
importance of granting as many Americans as possible subsidized and
affordable health insurance.191 He points out that some situations—with
the present one in mind—warrant examination exceeding a cursory readthrough into what exactly Congress intended in its legislation.192 The
Chief Justice determined that the language in the ACA was ambiguous
and appeared to provide subsidized care through state and federally
established Exchanges.193 In such an instance, the Chief Justice found it
appropriate to read the ambiguous text as an implicit delegation from
Congress to the IRS to be the ultimate interpreter.194 He found the tax
credits to be one of the ACA’s key reforms, and thus resolved that any
discussion regarding their interpretation involved significant insight into
the economic and political significance of the credits.195
Further, the Chief Justice found it especially unlikely that Congress
190. Id. at 45.
191. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483 (2015) (highlighting the significance between the two versions of
Exchanges at issue: one Exchange would provide affordable health insurance through billions of
federal dollars, while the other would not afford American residents such a luxury); see also
Respondents’ Brief, supra note 186, at 2 (“Among the many measures designed to achieve
Congress’s goals, the Act provides tax credits to make health insurance affordable for millions of
low- and moderate-income Americans.”).
192. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (describing how an agency’s statutory interpretation,
according to the Chevron framework, begins first with determining whether any ambiguities exist
in the language of the text, and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation of such text is reasonable);
see also id. at 2488–89 (“In extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before
concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” (citing FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000))).
193. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (describing how a statute that contains ambiguous language was
created as an implicit delegation from Congress to look to the qualified agency to interpret, or fill
in the gaps of, the statutory language).
194. Id.; see also supra notes 91–92 (describing how courts will often give deference to an
agency that is qualified through experience and knowledge to interpret an ambiguous statute).
195. Chief Justice Roberts illustrated the importance of offering tax credits, and how, because
of this, great insight and care is mandated in the interpretation of their application to state or federal
Exchanges:
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending
each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether
those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic
and political significance” that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished
to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
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would have intended the IRS to craft a health insurance policy—like the
IRS Rule—when the IRS has no expertise in the field of health insurance
policy drafting.196 Casting deference to the IRS for its “fill in the blanks”
capabilities would only be appropriate if the IRS had the expertise to
reasonably interpret and construe a healthcare statute—but the Supreme
Court majority found the IRS, a tax agency, lacked this expertise.197 By
showing zero deference to the agency, the Court assumed its role as “Plan
B”—allowing it, as the judiciary, to be the final authority in how the
language is interpreted when the statutory text cannot be enforced
according to its plain terms.198
Thereafter, the majority sought to analyze section 36B of the IRC.199
As aforementioned, this IRS Rule allowed federal subsidies to be given
to insureds that purchased health insurance through an Exchange
established by the state or through the Secretary, the federal option.200
Concurrent with the reasoning in the IRS Rule, the Chief Justice
explained that, if read literally, there would be no qualified individuals
on a federally established Exchange because the ACA defines a qualified
individual as someone who resides in the state that established the
Exchange.201 Therefore, if the state did not establish the Exchange, the
196. See id. (explaining how it is the Supreme Court’s role to determine the correct reading of
section 36B and that if the language of the statute is plain, it must be enforced according to the
terms set out, but if it is not plain, the judiciary must discern the meaning); see also supra note 66
(explaining how the judiciary must reject administrative constructions that are contrary to clear
congressional intent, like that of the IRS regarding its enactment of section 36B).
197. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“This is not a case for the IRS.”); see also supra note 65
(explaining what it means to give Chevron deference to an agency after the words in a statute have
been deemed ambiguous or when congressional intent is obviously unclear).
198. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“It is instead our task to determine the correct reading of
Section 36B. If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.”).
199. See id. (recognizing that the IRS could not be given deference to reasonably interpret the
tax credit provisions in the IRS, and beginning a judicial analysis of the same); see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 36B (making tax credits available to insureds on all Exchanges).
200. Chief Justice Roberts explains what must occur for an individual to lawfully receive tax
credits in purchasing health insurance through an Exchange according to section 36B:
As relevant here, section 36B allows an individual to receive tax credits only if the
individual enrolls in an insurance plan through “an Exchange established by the State
under [42 U.S.C. § 18031].” In other words, three things must be true: First, the
individual must enroll in an insurance plan through “an Exchange.” Second, that
Exchange must be “established by the State.” And third, that Exchange must be
established “under [42 U.S.C. § 18031].”
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (applying subsidies to participants in federal
exchanges as well as state exchanges); see also Part II(B) (discussing the issue with the IRS Rule
that prompted King).
201. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(d)(2)(A), 18032(f)(1)(A) (making qualified health plans available to
qualified individuals, then defining a qualified individual as someone who is a resident of the state
that established the Exchange from which the individual purchased health insurance).
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Chief Justice recognized that the individuals who purchased insurance in
that state could not be labeled as “qualified individuals.”202 He further
explained that Congress likely did not intend to use “established by the
State” in its natural meaning each time it was written through the ACA. 203
It was thus possible, according to the majority, that the single phrase
“established by the State” referred to all Exchanges, so that any qualified
individual who purchased health insurance through an Exchange, and
qualified for the subsidy, would receive the subsidy.204
The Chief Justice also criticized the manner in which the ACA was
drafted, noting that much of it was drafted behind closed doors instead of
utilizing the traditional, careful legislative process.205 This, he claimed,
reflected poor draftsmanship. But because the Chief Justice recognized
that rejecting the provision would be too risky, he implied that the natural
meaning of the ACA’s words might not reflect Congress’ genuine
intent.206
This provision—relating to federal subsidies—was so important that
rejecting it due to purported drafting errors would cause the ACA to
collapse, bringing national access to affordable health insurance down
202. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490 (“After telling each State to establish an Exchange, Section
18031 provides that all Exchanges ‘shall make available qualified health plans to qualified
individuals.’ Section 18032 then defines the term ‘qualified individual’ in part as an individual
who ‘resides in the State that established the Exchange.’ And that’s a problem: If we give the
phrase ‘the State that established the Exchange’ its most natural meaning, there would be no
‘qualified individuals’ on Federal Exchanges.” (internal citations omitted)).
203. See, e.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490 (“This problem [of not using the phrase in its natural
meaning] arises repeatedly throughout the Act,” like in section 18031(b)(2) where a state is allowed
to create an Exchange for qualified individuals and qualified small employers, instead of creating
separate exchanges); see also id. at 2492 (citing to the ACA’s use of three section 1563’s as an
example of “inartful drafting”).
204. Id. at 2491 (“But it is also possible that the phrase refers to all Exchanges—both State and
Federal—at least for purposes of the tax credits.”). But see id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority contradicts itself when it says that the most natural meaning of
“established by the state” would apply just to states, but then the majority goes on to say that the
quoted phrase could apply to both state and federal exchanges).
205. Id. at 2492 (majority opinion) (“The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few
examples of inartful drafting . . . [(e.g.,) the Act creates three separate Section 1563s.)] . . . Congress
wrote key parts of the Act behind closed doors, rather than through ‘the traditional legislative
process.”). For more information on the traditional legislative process, see John Cannan, A
Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative
History, 105 L. LIBR. J. 131, 162–63 (2013).
206. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (supporting the contention that Congress did not follow the
traditional legislative process in enacting the ACA by stating that Congress had passed much of the
ACA through reconciliation and “bypassed the Senate’s normal 60-vote filibuster requirement”).
For more information on reconciliation, see Cannan, supra note 205, at 159–70 (explaining that
“reconciliation” is a complicated budgetary procedure that limits opportunities for debate and
amendments).
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with it.207 Although Congress may have believed it was offering states a
deal that could not be refused, the Chief Justice interpreted this in a
different way.208 Instead, he pointed to the federal fallback provided in
section 1321—mandating the Secretary to establish an Exchange where
states opted to not do so—as proof that Congress was giving states an
incentive to establish an Exchange, but also expressly providing for
instances in which this did not occur.209 The Chief Justice doubted that
Congress would have wanted to limit the applicability of tax subsidies—
if it had, Congress could have expressed this in a variety of definitions of
qualified individuals or Exchanges throughout the ACA.210
The majority opinion concludes with a reference to the strong
precedent set in Marbury v. Madison: “Our role is more confined . . . to
say what the law is.”211 While the majority in King saw this statement as
a justification to aid the ACA in surviving its third challenge, 212 the
dissent argued that this statement baited the majority into thinking it
should save the ACA in any way possible.213
D. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
Although Chief Justice Roberts quoted Marbury214 to support his
207. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493 (“The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage
requirement could well push a State’s individual insurance market into a death spiral.”).
208. The petitioners argued that Congress believed it was offering states a deal they would not
refuse when offering federal subsidies to state residents that purchased insurance from an Exchange
established by that state. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 14. Even if this were true, and
Congress was wrong in its foresight, the petitioners argued that incorrect predictions in participation
were not an excuse to rewrite the ACA to resolve this. Id. at 36. But see King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494
(arguing that the federal fallback of section 18041, allowing the Secretary to establish the Exchange
where a state fails to do so, proves that Congress did not believe it was offering a deal that could
not be refused, but instead was stating expressly what would happen when states refused the deal).
209. See supra note 208 (explaining the difference between how the petitioners interpreted
congressional intent, and how the King majority viewed it).
210. Chief Justice Roberts offers an avenue Congress could have taken had it intended to limit
subsidies to state-established Exchanges:
We doubt that is what Congress meant to do. Had Congress meant to limit tax credits to
State Exchanges, it likely would have done so in the definition of “applicable taxpayer”
or in some other prominent manner. It would not have used such a winding path of
connect-the-dots provisions about the amount of the credit.
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495.
211. Id. at 2496 (citing Marbury, 1 Cranch at 177) (reinforcing the idea that the role of the
legislature must always be respected).
212. This was the third challenge to the ACA, as the constitutionality of the individual mandate
and the Medicaid expansion provision were challenged in Sebelius. See supra text accompanying
notes 38–50 (summarizing the pertinent facts and outcomes of Sebelius).
213. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Part III(C) (discussing Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion in King).
214. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (“In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those
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insistence that the power to make the law rests with those who are chosen
by the people, Justice Scalia believed this was construed far too
broadly.215 And again, while Chief Justice Roberts contended that to read
legislation fairly, one must have a qualified understanding of the
legislative plan, Justice Scalia strongly believed that the ACA did not
receive the fair reading that it deserved.216 Instead, according to Justice
Scalia, the majority went beyond its inherent powers and effectively
rewrote the law.217
The majority opinion focused on the issue of whether the ACA’s
reforms apply equally in each state regardless of who (i.e., the state or the
federal government) establishes the Exchange within the state.218 This
issue is distinguished against the concern that Justice Scalia saw, and
explained in his dissent.219 Justice Scalia saw an error in the role of the
judiciary versus the legislature, while the majority saw error in not
providing as many people as possible with affordable health insurance
when it was given the opportunity to do this—looking at what they like
to call a drafting mistake, instead of a legislative plan not unfolding as
anticipated.220
Justice Scalia opposed a case-by-case determination of legislative

chosen by the people. Our role is more confined—‘to say what the law is.’” (citing Marbury, 1
Cranch at 177)).
215. See id. at 2505 (arguing that the majority took whatever approach it wanted to in
interpreting the ACA, and reminding readers that the judiciary is meant to apply the law, not
improve upon it in the manner it sees fit); see also supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text
(discussing the IRS’s interpretation of section 36B of the IRC).
216. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A fair reading of legislation demands a
fair understanding of the legislative plan.”).
217. See id. at 2501 (explaining that the Supreme Court did not need to rewrite the law because
the legislation was clear on its face and was not anywhere near ambiguous enough to warrant such
interpretation from the Court); see also id. at 2500 (“This Court ‘does not revise legislation . . . just
because the text as written creates an apparent anomaly.’” (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2033 (2014))).
218. Id. at 2485 (majority opinion) (stating that the issue in King is whether the ACA’s
provisions regarding Exchanges, specifically, apply to all Exchanges, regardless of the entity that
established the Exchange).
219. See id. at 2502 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the manner in which the majority decided
the case “outlandish” and far from the ordinary meaning of the statutory language).
220. See id. at 2496 (majority opinion) (holding that Congress most likely intended to improve
health insurance markets, not destroy them, and thus warrants the interpretation that subsidized
healthcare ought to be available on exchanges established by both the state and the federal
government); see also id. at 2499–500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority simply
got it wrong in both their role relating to legislative interpretation, and in the interpretation itself,
because there is no way that “established by the State” means anything but “established by the
State” or not established by the state); see also supra notes 148–152 and accompanying text
(discussing King).
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intent because, he thought, judicial lawmaking should be avoided
whenever possible, if not altogether.221 He determined the meaning of
statutory text by presuming authorship of some ideal drafter who meets
the proper standards of syntax, semantics, and grammar.222 This served
his textualist objectives very well, because it limited the judicial
interpreter’s discretion and, hopefully, goads the legislature into more
careful drafting.223 This originalist (or textualist) approach to judicial
interpretation is advocated because Justice Scalia believed it assisted the
Court in producing a unified front.224
As a proven advocate of textual commitment to the Constitution and
legislation, Justice Scalia read the words of the ACA with what he
perceived as their intended operative effect.225 He saw a great issue with
reading “an Exchange established by the State” as “by the State or federal
government.”226 A legislative interpreter (i.e., those justices serving on
the Supreme Court) must give effect to every word and every clause of a
statute.227 As learned in Marbury, legislators do not (or are not supposed
to) use terms devoid of meaning.228 Thus, interpreting “by the State” to
comprise the meaning of “by the State or federal government,” causes

221. Popkin, supra note 59, at 1186.
222. Id. at 1143.
223. Id.
224. George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1304
(1989–1990) (“Originalism therefore prospers, or at least survives, because the truth is, ‘You can’t
beat somebody with nobody.’” (quoting Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 849, 855 (1989))).
225. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497–98 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority decision gives the phrase “established by the State” no operative meaning or effect because
the majority decided that that phrase means “established by the State or the Federal Government”);
see also Ralph A. Rossum, The Textualist Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, 28 PERSP. ON POL. SCI.
5, 5 (1999) (discussing how Justice Scalia urges judges to take on a textualist approach in statutory
interpretation; an approach guided by the text and its ordinary meaning instead of the intentions or
ideals that may or may not surround it).
226. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2) (outlining which Exchanges are authorized to provide
subsidized healthcare); see also supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s
dissent in King). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041 (distinguishing between a state-established
and a federally established Exchange, respectively).
227. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority failed “to
give effect . . . to [every] clause and word” of the ACA and, instead, gave the exchange provision
a different meaning (citing Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
228. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 138 (1803) (1803) (“An act of congress repugnant
to the constitution [cannot] become a law.”).
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this phrase to completely lose its originally limiting value.229
As stated, the ACA gives authority to the states to establish their own
Exchanges in section 1311—and, in section 1321, the federal government
is granted authority to establish an Exchange in the states that opt out of
establishing a section 1311 Exchange.230 Justice Scalia pointed out that
the authority to establish the Exchange clearly comes from separate
sources, and that this is just another notch in the ladder of contextual cues
undermining the majority’s opinion.231 The rest of the ACA has other
sharp distinctions as to who can establish an Exchange and what the
repercussions will be if it is state versus federally established:232 the
source of funding is different (i.e., for states it comes from section
18031(a) and for federally established Exchanges it comes from section
18121233); who runs the Exchange is different (i.e., the state runs a statecreated Exchange, while the Secretary runs a federally created
Exchange)234; and, interestingly, the Secretary only obtains the power to
229. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s dissent in King).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (instructing states to establish health insurance Exchanges); see id.
at § 18041(c) (providing that HHS can establish an Exchange in the state that fails to establish the
Exchange); see also Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 11 (explaining further the separation of
and difference in sections 1311 and 1321 of the ACA).
231. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (depicting the differences between sections
1311 and 1321 of the ACA); see also King, 135 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The States’
authority to set up Exchanges comes from one provision, § 18031(b); the Secretary’s authority
comes from an entirely different provision, § 18041(c).”).
232. Justice Scalia, in King, cites to several provisions in the ACA where he believes the
congressional intent—having state-established Exchanges be fundamentally different from federal
exchanges—is clearly illustrated.
Funding for States to establish Exchanges comes from one part of the law, § 18031(a);
funding for the Secretary to establish Exchanges comes from an entirely different part
of the law, § 18121. States generally run state-created Exchanges; the Secretary
generally runs federally created Exchanges. § 18041(b)–(c). And the Secretary’s
authority to set up an Exchange in a State depends upon the State’s “[f]ailure to establish
[an] Exchange.” § 18041(c) (emphasis added). Provisions such as these destroy any
pretense that a federal Exchange is in some sense also established by a State.
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2498–99 (discussing how the ACA
has a number of provisions apart from section 36B of the IRC that distinguishes state-established
Exchanges from those established by the federal government, and how adopting the federal
government’s interpretation of “established by the State” serves to nullify multiple other provisions
in the ACA).
233. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s dissent in King);
see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(a), 18121(a)–(b) (showing that the funding sources for stateestablished Exchanges and federally established Exchanges are outlined in different provisions of
the ACA—funding for state Exchanges is described in section 18031(a), and funding for federally
established Exchanges is described in section 18121).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(b)–(c) (requiring states to establish Exchanges per the standards set
forth in section 18041(a), and, if a state fails to do so, noting that the federal government has the
authority to establish and run a federally created Exchange in that state).
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establish a federal Exchange when the state fails to establish a state-run
Exchange.235 Justice Scalia believed his illustration of these stark
differences in the ACA significantly undermined the majority’s argument
that an Exchange established by the federal government is entitled to the
same treatment as an Exchange established by the state.236
Justice Scalia also asserted that it is not the Supreme Court’s
responsibility to rescue legislation from alleged drafting errors by
Congress.237 Further, he found it not only plausible that the section 36B
tax credits were intended to serve as an incentive for states to establish
Exchanges per the ACA guidelines, but that this could be the exact intent
that Congress had in mind.238
While one reading of “Exchange established by the State” clearly
provides a better outcome for Americans, Justice Scalia and the
petitioners in King made the valid point that the judiciary cannot merely
rewrite laws when they are found to have negative societal
repercussions.239 Justice Scalia advocated for this textual commitment
to statutory language.240 This contention goes back to the foundational
case of McCulloch v. Maryland, where Justice Marshall stated that “it is
235. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (giving the federal government the power to establish an Exchange
in the state only when the state fails to do so).
236. See supra note 232 (discussing Justice Scalia’s dissent in King); see also King, 135 S. Ct.
at 2498 (“Provisions such as these destroy any pretense that a federal Exchange is in some sense
also established by a State.”).
237. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court, however, has no free-floating
power ‘to rescue Congress from its drafting errors.’” (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526,
542 (2004))).
238. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is entirely plausible that tax credits were restricted
to state Exchanges deliberately—for example, in order to encourage States to establish their own
Exchanges. We therefore have no authority to dismiss the terms of the law as a drafting fumble.”);
see also 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2) (outlining which Exchanges are authorized to provide subsidized
healthcare).
239. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]ouldn’t that outcome satisfy two of
the Act’s goals rather than just one: enabling the Act’s reforms to work and promoting state
involvement in the Act’s implementation?”). Justice Scalia further states:
This case requires us to decide whether someone who buys insurance on an Exchange
established by the Secretary gets tax credits. You would think the answer would be
obvious—so obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to hear a case
about it. In order to receive any money under [section] 36B, an individual must enroll
in an insurance plan through an “Exchange established by the State.” The Secretary of
Health and Human Services is not a State. So, an Exchange established by the Secretary
is not an Exchange established by the State—which means people who buy health
insurance through such an Exchange get no money under [section] 36B.
Id. at 2496–97.
240. See Popkin, supra note 59, at 1133 (explaining how Justice Scalia is committed to the text
of the legislation); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
interpretation in Dublino).
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a constitution we are expounding,” noting that the Constitution is an
outline to be interpreted, not reworked to serve the judiciary’s desires.241
More attention ought to be given to the congressional practice of
writing each word with specific intent behind it.242 As Justice Scalia
explained, misplacing a comma is more likely to occur than gross
grammatical errors in legislative drafting, and he practiced deference to
the text of legislation.243 For him, “only established canons of
construction can unsettle ordinary meaning, and substantive policies are
admissible only to check whether the statutory text makes sense.”244
Justice Scalia’s argument was clear—he firmly believed the stated
purpose was, in fact, for state Exchanges to be the only Exchanges
offering subsidized healthcare, and that the ACA posed a clear
congressional preference for state action over federal interference.245 In
sum, Justice Scalia argued that the Supreme Court was not merely acting
outside the scope of its powers, but that it stepped in to reconfigure a
clause that was only meant to serve as a fallback.246
III. ANALYSIS
While the Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States, the
higher the court does not necessarily equate to the sounder the holding.247
241. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819); see Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional
Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1980–1981) (interpreting Justice Marshall’s
statement that a constitution is to be expounded upon to mean that, while an outline is naturally a
document that adapts to the crises around it, the constitution is also a document full of particular,
carefully-placed limits that does not allow for great freedoms to construe meanings as the reader
pleases).
242. MANUAL FOR DRAFTING LEGISLATION § 1.1 (6th Ed. 2009) (“A drafter who cares
passionately about clear writing understands fully the myth of legislative intent. The rule of law is
possible only if words have lives of their own. The drafter must choose words that will speak
clearly long after the words are written.”).
243. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 170 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
244. See id. at 1142 (“For Justice Scalia, only established canons of construction can unsettle
ordinary meaning, and substantive policies are admissible only to check whether the statutory text
makes sense.”).
245. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2504 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
ACA illustrates a “congressional preference for state participation” in Exchange establishment, and
that ruling otherwise, while providing a good outcome of subsidized healthcare for many, frustrates
the very goal of state action).
246. Id. (citing to the provisions of the ACA to emphasize his contention that Congress
intentionally gave states the first opportunity to establish an Exchange, then, and only as a fallback,
permitted the federal government to establish an Exchange in the state if that state failed to do so);
see 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (outlining the responsibilities of the Secretary in establishing an exchange
within states that fail to establish a state-run exchange).
247. The outcome of King has been deemed full of irony, and thus not necessarily laying claim
to a descriptor of soundness:
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The decision in King embodies an obvious pursuit to preserve the ACA
on the Court’s terms.248 Regardless of the difference between section
1311’s and section 1321’s definitions of Exchanges, it appears that the
Supreme Court used King to illustrate its ease in exchanging a reasonable,
textualist approach to statutory interpretation, for an exhibition of judicial
power.249
When examining the text, there is no reason to believe that any part of
the Exchange provisions of the ACA are ambiguous, especially to the
level of warranting judicial interpretation of the highest court, over
deference to a lesser-qualified agency.250 Revisiting the facts, a
It is a decision rich with irony. For example: the Chief Justice refuses to give Chevron
deference to the IRS’s interpretation of the statute because “[i]t is especially unlikely
that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in
crafting health insurance policy of this sort.” Never mind that just three years ago the
Chief Justice himself saved the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate – another of
the three core ACA features shaping the Chief Justice’s statutory interpretation in
King—by interpreting it as a tax.
Adam White, Symposium: Defining Deference Down, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2015, 11:27 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-defining-deference-down/.
248. See id. (“[T]he . . . Court has significantly reinforced and reinvigorated the ‘major
questions’ doctrine . . . [in effort] to restrain the administrative state by infusing the interpretation
of regulatory statutes with structural constitutional concerns – namely, that the courts must not
presume that Congress delegates vast powers to regulatory agencies through obscure statutes.”).
The “major questions” doctrine is an exception to granting Chevron deference to agencies, and
allows courts to interpret legislation with potentially big policy impacts. For more information on
the “major questions” doctrine, see Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions”
Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Non-Interference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA
Got it Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 594 (2008) (“The purpose of the rule, then, is to prevent
agencies from altering the regulatory backdrop against which Congress is negotiating, and the
purpose of judicial enforcement of [the] rule is to restore the pre-interference regulatory reality so
that congressional negotiations can pick up where they left off.”). See also King, 135 S. Ct. at 2507
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court majority so clearly wants to preserve the
ACA, that it ought to be called “SCOTUScare”).
249. See James Lankford, Judicial Deference Enables Agencies to Usurp Congress’s
Legislative
Power,
NAT.
REV.
(July
14,
2015,
4:00
AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421124/judicial-deference-enables-agencies-usurpcongresss-legislative-power-james-lankford (claiming that the Supreme Court chose not to give
Chevron deference to the IRS, but instead gave deference to its own interpretation of the law); see
also Gluck, supra note 57 (explaining how textualist judges have spent decades trying to convince
judges of all political backgrounds to follow in their line of reasoning, but the King challengers put
all of this at risk).
250. The text “established by the state” is clear and unambiguous:
Here, the text of Obamacare clearly limits subsidies to individuals who purchase
insurance through state-run exchanges. That ends the matter. But even if the text is
ambiguous, interpreting the statute to permit subsidies on federally established
exchanges is not reasonable because it contravenes Congress’s intent in conditioning
subsidies on creation of state-run exchanges. Under both steps of Chevron, this
interpretation fails.
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subscriber to a state-established Exchange will be eligible for a subsidy
for each month that this subscriber is covered by a plan that he or she
“enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State.”251 But, if a
state did not establish an Exchange by the January 1, 2014 deadline, the
Secretary could establish and operate an Exchange within the state that
declined to establish its own.252 When the IRS Rule contradicted the
ACA by effectively providing subsidies to insureds that bought insurance
on all healthcare Exchanges, it illustrated that an Exchange in the state
does not support the assertion that it is an Exchange established by the
state itself.253
This Part covers a critical analysis of the soundness of the outcome of
King.254 It discusses alternative treatments of the issues presented and
distinguishes any questions that the Supreme Court left unanswered on
the issues of the ACA, subsidy eligibility, and the separation between
what should remain with the legislature and what is appropriate for the
judiciary to decide.255 Finally, this Part covers the alternative solutions
that were, or could have been, considered in King.256
A. The Soundness of a Claim for Ambiguity
The soundness of a decision is determined by the argument’s reasoning
and validity.257 Statutory interpretation is incredibly important, and
Justice Scalia proposed—and enforced to the extent that he could—the
use of the text as the basis for such interpretation because it is a commonsense notion that lends itself well to judicial consistency and

Orrin G. Hatch, King v. Burwell and the Rule of Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 2, 6–7 (2015). See
also 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2011) (providing subsidies for applicable taxpayers who purchase insurance
through an Exchange established by the state).
251. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2011); see also Hatch, supra note 250, at 7 (summarizing
eligibility requirements for obtaining subsidies from state-established Exchanges).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1). See also Hatch, supra note 250, at 7 (summarizing the role of
the federal government that was conditioned on the state’s opting out of its role in establishing an
Exchange).
253. Id. at 8 (“There is, in short, no ambiguity in the statute. Subsidies are available for plans
purchased through state exchanges. Subsidies are not available for plans purchased through
federally established exchanges.”).
254. See infra Part III(A) (discussing the soundness of a claim for ambiguity).
255. See infra Part III(C) (discussing alternative treatments of the ACA, subsidies, and
separation of powers).
256. See infra Part III(C) (discussing alternative treatments of the ACA, subsidies, and
separation of powers).
257. Aaron
Ancel,
Fundamentals:
Soundness,
KHANACADEMY,
https://www.khanacademy.org/partner-content/wi-phi/critical-thinking/v/soundness (last visited
Nov. 7, 2015) (explaining the components of a sound argument).
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reliability.258 Yet, when faced with four plain words, attached to four
plain meanings, some judges still find ambiguity.259
To reiterate, the Court’s reasoning throughout King taught that there
were, in fact, ambiguities present in the Exchange provisions of the ACA
that needed clarification by the Court.260 But, the petitioners’ arguments
held merit: the statutory text contained no ambiguities, and if it did, the
Court still interpreted it wrong.261
Even if ambiguities were found, the IRS should not have enacted a
Rule that ran counter to what the ACA clearly encompassed.262 The
Court’s acknowledgment that the Court would not apply Chevron
deference to the IRS Rule—because the IRS allegedly did not possess the
requisite skill, experience, and knowledge to authorize premium tax
credits from federally established health insurance Exchanges—was the
258. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2497 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plain,
obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden
sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and
powerful intellect would discover.” (citing Lynch v. Alworth–Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370
(1925))); see Popkin, supra note 59, at 1138 (explaining that Justice Scalia prefers a textual
approach to statutory interpretation because “the rule of law should be a law of rules”); see also
Gluck, supra note 57 (“[N]o interpretive fault is more common than the failure to follow the wholetext canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure
and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts” (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia)); see
also Gluck, supra note 57 (“Textualists have spent the past thirty years persuading even their
opponents of the jurisprudential benefits of a sophisticated text-based interpretive approach.”); see
also Rachel VanSickle-Ward, The Supreme Court Is Debating Ambiguities in Obamacare. So Why
Do Politicians Even Write Ambiguous Laws?, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 6, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/06/the-supreme-court-isdebating-ambiguities-in-obamacare-so-why-do-politicians-even-write-ambiguous-laws/ (“More
precisely worded policy provides more direction and less discretion to bureaucratic and judicial
actors.”).
259. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that words no longer have
meaning when “established by the State” does not mean exactly that—established by the state).
260. See generally id. (majority opinion) (holding that the ACA accorded subsidized healthcare
to those that purchased insurance on both Exchanges established by the state as well as those
established by the federal government); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041 (mandating that states
establish Exchanges, and that the Secretary of HHS will establish them in states that fail to do so);
see also supra notes 166–185 and accompanying text (discussing the petitioners’ brief and
encompassed arguments in King).
261. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “established by the
State” is simply not an ambiguous statement mandating interpretation because it means exactly
what it says). But see VanSickle-Ward, supra note 258 (suggesting that calling a piece of
legislation ambiguous is more of an invitation for compromise when key participants disagree over
its details).
262. Andy S. Grewal, Lurking Challenges to the ACA Tax Credit Regulations, Univ. of Iowa
C. of Law, Research Paper No. 15-20 (2015), reprinted in BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX REP.
(May 21, 2015) (“Because [the IRS Rule] contradicts the congressionally prescribed criteria, it
reflects an impermissible interpretation of the statute.”).
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Court’s way of saying that Congress’ failure to expressly delegate policy
interpretation of ambiguous language to the IRS was the open door for
the Court to defer to its own construction.263
But, it is important to note that the IRS did not have any expertise in
health insurance or in crafting health insurance policies, so there was no
reason for the Court to defer to the IRS in the first place.264 Interestingly,
the Court managed to endorse the IRS Rule without giving deference to
the agency.265 It is peculiar, though, that the Court was willing to
recognize an explicit absence of a delegation to the IRS, but not the
explicit absence of “or the federal government” after “established by the
State.”266
Further, the majority opinion attempted a sound argument in its claim
that Exchanges established per section 1311 and section 1321 of the ACA
were functionally, for all intents and purposes, the same Exchange.267
The ACA clearly states, though, that to be eligible for subsidies, the
Exchange must have been established “under section 1311” of the
ACA.268 The condition provided for creating federal Exchanges is
263. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (arguing that it is highly unlikely that Congress would have
delegated this sort of decision on Exchanges to the IRS); see Lankford, supra note 249 (describing
how the majority in King decided to give deference to its own interpretation of the statute).
264. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (2015) (arguing that this is not a case to be decided by the
IRS); see also Gluck, supra note 57 (explaining that Chevron deference occurs where deference is
given to a qualified agency to interpret ambiguous legislation). For more information, see generally
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
265. See White, supra note 247 (expressing surprise that the Supreme Court refused to give
Chevron deference to the IRS, but then ultimately endorsed the IRS’s statutory interpretation,
which, even further, was deemed “at odds” with the most natural meaning of the statute’s text).
266. See Paula Stannard et al., King v. Burwell: The Supreme Court as Interpreter, ALSTON &
BIRD: CLIENT ADVISORY 1, 6 (June 26, 2015) (noting how the Court strayed from a typical Chevron
analysis to construe the ambiguous language of the ACA directly).
267. Chief Justice Roberts equated Exchanges established by the state and established by the
federal government:
By using the phrase “such Exchange,” section 18041 instructs the Secretary to establish
and operate the same Exchange that the State was directed to establish under section
18031. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1661 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “such” as “That or
those; having just been mentioned”). In other words, State Exchanges and Federal
Exchanges are equivalent—they must meet the same requirements, perform the same
functions, and serve the same purposes. Although State and Federal Exchanges are
established by different sovereigns, sections 18031 and 18041 do not suggest that they
differ in any meaningful way. A Federal Exchange therefore counts as “an Exchange”
under section 36B.
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489–90.
268. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (requiring the IRS Rule coverage to apply only to “an
Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA]”); see also Hatch, supra note
250, at 8 (explaining that the IRS provision specifies that the state Exchange must have been
established under section 1311 of the ACA).
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located under an entirely different section: section 1321.269 There is
simply no reading that provides any correlation between a state Exchange
established under section 1311 and a federally established Exchange
under section 1321.270
Additionally, the majority disregarded an important takeaway—and
valid argument—from the prior opinion it vacated before granting
certiorari to King: federal Exchanges only satisfy two out of three
required elements of an Exchange permitted to grant its qualified
purchasers tax credits.271 There is no reading of section 1321 that implies
a federal Exchange is also an Exchange established by the state; rather,
federal Exchanges are only (1) Exchanges (2) established under section
1311.272 Chief Justice Roberts attempted to use this “sameness”
argument to prove that a federal Exchange was therefore an Exchange for
purposes of allowing subsidies across all Exchanges, but his idea of
sameness is unfortunately different from the natural meaning of
sameness.273
This returns to Justice Scalia’s sound, and arguably preferred, means
of examining what the text explicitly says and fairly implies.274 It is the
269. See 42 USC § 18041(c)(1) (discussing the federal fallback provision); see also Hatch,
supra note 250, at 8 (arguing that the placement of the different Exchanges throughout the statute
(i.e., in section 1311 for state and section 1321 for the federal government) further supports the
contention that a federally established Exchange is, by its very definition, not a state-established
Exchange).
270. See Hatch, supra note 250, at 8 (emphasizing that there is absolutely no ambiguity in the
text of the statute, and that subsidies are clearly not available through federal Exchanges established
per section 1321 of the ACA).
271. The majority in Halbig ruled against the IRS Rule because federal Exchanges did not
satisfy all of the elements required by the Rule:
Under section 36B, subsidies are available only for plans “enrolled in through an
Exchange established by the State under Section 1311 of the [ACA].” Of the three
elements of that provision—(1) an Exchange (2) established by the State (3) under
section 1311—federal Exchanges satisfy only two: they are Exchanges established under
section 1311.
Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
272. See id. (explaining that the federal Exchanges failed to satisfy all elements of Exchanges
under section 1311 because an Exchange established by the federal government cannot be an
Exchange established by a state); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041 (describing state and federal
Exchanges).
273. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489–90 (2015) (arguing that, despite being
established by different sovereigns, the text of sections 1311 and 1321 does not suggest that these
provisions differ in any meaningful way).
274. Justice Scalia was a renowned textualist who looked to the text of legislation first to discern
its meaning, and rejected judicial speculation on congressional intent. For more information, see
Ken Adams, Some Thoughts on Scalia and Garner’s Book “Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts”, ADAMS ON CONT. DRAFTING (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/scaliaand-garners-book-reading-law-the-interpretation-of-legal-texts/ (“Textualism, in its purest form,
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judge’s job to determine what facts fall in or outside of the guidelines
established by the text, and it is not the judge’s job to forcefully fit such
facts within those textual boundaries.275 Justice Scalia discerned
legislative meaning by examining, in order, the ordinary meaning of the
text, the surrounding text, and the large group of statutes passed by the
legislature.276 Hence, Justice Scalia determined that “established by the
State” had the ordinary meaning of “established by the State,” when
surrounded by statutory language consistent with this meaning and also
among the vast number of like provisions enacted by the ACA. It is,
therefore, not surprising that his formulaic and reliable approach brought
him to conclude that federal Exchanges established per section 1321 of
the ACA were not intended to be afforded the same rights as stateestablished Exchanges.277
B. Alternative Solutions if the Supreme Court Had Found for the
Petitioners
The Supreme Court did not need to decide King in the manner that it
did.278 The original drafters in Congress could have amended the
ACA279 and the Court also could have more thoroughly investigated
congressional intent.280 Perhaps the most obvious alternative is that the
Supreme Court—when faced with the absence of a formal circuit split
begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.” (quoting Justice Scalia)).
275. Popkin, supra note 59, at 1133; see also supra Part I(B) (discussing what it means to have
a textual commitment to the Constitution and the words of legislation).
276. See Popkin, supra note 59, at 1140 (describing Justice Scalia’s deference to text and rules
to provide guidance in statutory interpretation); see also id. at 1142 (“For Justice Scalia, only
established canons of construction can unsettle ordinary meaning, and substantive policies are
admissible only to check whether the statutory text makes sense.”).
277. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the almost comical way
the majority found for the respondents in King and how state and federally established Exchanges
are so fundamentally different that they could never be considered the same).
278. See infra text accompanying notes 280–281 (discussing why the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in King).
279. But cf., Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Another ObamaCare Glitch, WALL ST.
J.:
COMMENT.
(Nov.
16,
2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203687504577006322431330662 (recognizing
that Congress had the ability to amend the legislation, but the Obama administration found the error
so egregious that it wanted to rewrite the ACA without involving Congress).
280. The ACA is not a dated piece of legislation, and with such a strong focus on congressional
intent, there could have been greater showing of discerning what this actual intent was by
consultation with members of Congress. Actual ACA drafters from the Democratic party were
even available to comment on what they had intended. For more information, see Sarah Kliff, The
People Who Wrote Obamacare Think the New Supreme Court Case Is Ridiculous, VOX (Nov. 7,
2014, 2:39 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/23/5927169/halbig-says-congress-meant-to-limitsubsidies-congress-disagrees.
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between the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals—did
not need to grant certiorari to review King.281
The drafters of the ACA clearly contemplated that there would be
qualified individuals under the Exchanges, but the ACA does not seem to
provide for qualified individuals who purchase insurance from an
Exchange not established by the state.282 In the pursuit of equal
application of justice, surely a legislative challenge cannot be rejected
because it would destabilize the insurance market.283 There was an
inadequate showing that rejecting this challenge to the ACA would result
in insurance market instability.284
An analysis of the consequences if there was a ruling in the petitioners’
favor was published prior to the ultimate decision, examining the
perceived devastation that would come.285 The authors, after an
exhaustive showing of graphs and data, predicted that there would be 8.2
million more people uninsured and 35 percent higher premiums.286 If
281. There are many reasons for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to a case. In this instance,
certiorari was likely granted because King concerned an important question of federal law because
of its impact through the ACA. Additionally, certiorari could have been granted because many
states were starting to litigate this issue, and the Supreme Court’s review of the ACA could
efficiently surface a clear, nationwide understanding of the law. Further, the Supreme Court was
aware that this subsidy eligibility created a divide amongst circuit courts, and was likely to soon
create a formal circuit split. For more information, see Johnathan H. Adler, Why did the court grant
cert in King v. Burwell?, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 7, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/07/why-did-the-courtgrant-cert-in-king-v-burwell/?utm_term=.5bf97b924a9a. See also SUP. CT. R. 10 (explaining
considerations that govern review on certiorari).
282. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490 (describing how it would be problematic to limit qualified
individuals to those who purchased insurance from a state-established Exchange); but see id. at
2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court, however, concludes that this limitation would prevent
the rest of the Act from working as well as hoped. So it rewrites the law to make tax credits
available everywhere. We should start calling this law SCOTUScare.”).
283. Id. at 2493 (majority opinion) (“Here, the statutory scheme compels the Court to reject
petitioners’ interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State
with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very “death spirals” that Congress designed the Act
to avoid.”); but see Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 141 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that avoiding unhappy circumstances is an inadequate basis for legislative interpretation).
284. Linda J. Blumberg et al., The Implications of a Supreme Court Finding for the Plaintiff in
King vs. Burwell: 8.2 Million More Uninsured and 35% Higher Premiums, URBAN INST. 1, 2 (Jan.
2015),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000062-TheImplications-King-vs-Burwell.pdf (offering only one prediction as to the repercussions of an
outcome for the petitioners).
285. Id. (predicting the direct and indirect implications of finding a verdict in favor of the
petitioners in King).
286. Predictions on the repercussions of a verdict in favor of the King petitioners:
We estimate that a victory for the plaintiff would increase the number of uninsured in 34
states by 8.2 million people (a 44 percent increase in the uninsured relative to the number
of uninsured under the law as currently implemented) and eliminate $28.8 million in tax

11_KEARNEY_DOCUMENT6 (291-350).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

340

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/3/2017 1:20 PM

[Vol. 48

this had been the case, a textualist reading of the statute would indicate
that Congress likely intended to incentivize states to avoid such
devastation.287 One would also think states would want to provide these
federal funds to its citizens, therefore, state inaction likely occurred when
states knew their inaction led to no damaging repercussions.288
The impact of deciding otherwise in King might have also been a good
thing.289 Without subsidies on federal Exchanges, state residents in states
with federal Exchanges would face much higher costs and likely
unaffordable healthcare.290 Circling back to the likely intent of Congress,
this outcome reasonably would have been the push states needed to
establish their own Exchange to avoid depriving their residents of
affordable healthcare.291 This case raises significant red flags in the
department of legislative interpretation, as there is now case precedent
that says this is no longer as important as once thought.292 If one cannot
rely on what the law plainly says, forthcoming legislation will be read
credits and cost-sharing reductions in 2016 ($340 billion over 10 years) for 9.3 million
people. In addition, the number of people obtaining insurance through the private
nongroup markets in these states would fall by 69 percent, from 14.2 million to 4.5
million, with only 3.4 million of these remaining in the ACA’s marketplaces.
Id.
287. Lempert, supra note 185 (“The model that the petitioners have of the Congressional mind
seems to be one in which Congress is so sure that states would not want to deprive their citizens of
federal subsidies that the threat of their unavailability would induce them to set up [E]xchanges.”).
288. Hatch, supra note 250, at 9 (“But there is good reason to believe Congress did intend to
deny subsidies for federally enrolled plans, and not just because that’s what the statute says. The
reason is that Congress needed a way to incentivize the states to create their own [E]xchanges.”).
289. See id. at 9–10 (describing the benefits of deciding for the petitioners (e.g., encouraging
state action over a federally controlled insurance market)). For additional examples regarding the
many benefits that would have resulted had the Supreme Court decided for the respondents in King,
see Michael F. Cannon, Benefits of ‘King v. Burwell’: More Jobs, Higher Incomes & 70 Million
Freed from Illegal Taxes, FORBES: HEALTHCARE, FISCAL, & TAX (June 24, 2015, 11:32 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcannon/2015/06/24/benefits-of-king-v-burwell-more-jobshigher-incomes-70-million-freed-from-illegal-taxes/.
290. See Hatch, supra note 250, at 10 (describing how the Obama administration and Supreme
Court essentially waited too long in addressing the IRS Rule, and how because of this, thirty-four
states let HHS establish federal Exchanges instead of being properly incentivized by the original
intent of the ACA).
291. Id.
292. Describing how King set a dangerous precedent for future statutory interpretation:
Most disturbing is that this decision now sets a precedent. That is, even when the
language in a contract or a law is written clearly and in plain language, a party may be
free to take actions inconsistent with the wording and later claim that their actions are
consistent with the intent of the document. Does this now mean that clear, plain language
may not be as clear and plain as the parties believe?
Michael Busler, The Baffling Supreme Court Obamacare Decisions Sets a Dangerous Precedent,
EPICTIMES: POL. (June 25, 2015), http://www.epictimes.com/michaelbusler/2015/06/the-bafflingsupreme-court-obamacare-decision-sets-a-dangerous-precedent/3/.
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with SCOTUS-colored lenses.293
In Halbig, the D.C. Circuit Court found that the ACA contained
ambiguous language, that the Court could rightfully interpret it, and that
the tax credits were meant to be restricted to the health insurance
purchasers in a state-run Exchange.294 Unfortunately, a difference in
opinion existed between the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in King and
the D.C. Court of Appeals in Halbig on what to do with this sort of
challenge to the ACA.295 The Supreme Court decided to grant certiorari
in King in November of 2014, removing the possibility of maintaining
textual commitment to statutory language.296 Had this been properly left
to the states, or properly left to be decided in the respective circuits,
traditional analysis of statutory meaning could have been preserved.297
Even though Congress might have believed it was offering states a
great deal with the tax incentives through the Exchange process, this idea
did not pan out as planned.298 Despite Congress’ mistake regarding the
willingness of states to create and implement an Exchange, however, this
does not give the Supreme Court the power to rewrite the ACA to align
it with some justices’ perceived views of its original intent.299 The states
might have created these Exchanges on their own if the IRS Rule had
been erased and incentives had been maintained.300
The petitioners argued that the IRS stepped in before states had a
chance to use the incentives Congress wanted to give them. 301 The
293. See id. (describing the reliability of the law as established in King).
294. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the ambiguous statute
would not be interpreted to allow federal Exchanges to offer subsidized healthcare).
295. Joyce Frieden, Appeals Courts Rule Opposite Ways on ACA Subsidies, MEDPAGE TODAY
(July 22, 2014), http://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/Reform/46884 (“Opposing
rulings by two federal appeals courts Tuesday on the legality of subsidies for people purchasing
insurance through the Affordable Care Act’s federally run exchanges are almost certainly going to
send the issue up to the Supreme Court, experts said.”).
296. The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari to King:
The Supreme Court . . . agreed . . . to decide how far the federal government can extend
its program of subsidies to buyers of health insurance. At issue is whether the program
of tax credits applies only in the consumer marketplaces set up by sixteen states, and not
at federally operated sites in thirty-four states.
Denniston, supra note 55.
297. See Stannard, supra note 266, at 5–6 (describing the implications of different outcomes for
King).
298. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2494 (2015) (explaining how Congress may have
intended to provide incentives to states through subsidies, but these incentives were not powerful
enough).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 36; see also King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494 (explaining how
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government’s argument regarding Congress’ purpose reduces to this
notion that section 36B subsidies are too important to be conditioned on
states having the option to establish, or not establish, an online
Exchange.302 The government argues that Congress would never have
created something so important that gave states merely the option to
participate.303 Further, just because the Chief Justice claims the
legislation was written in a hasty manner, does not necessitate the Court
stepping in to clean up a semantics mess—if read properly, there was not
even a mess to begin with.304
C. Alternative Treatments of the ACA, Subsidies, and Separation of
Powers
Many Americans feared a catastrophe if a decision for the petitioners
resulted from King, but what would have really happened?305 If the
majority decision in King had been for the petitioners instead, it might
have destroyed the ACA, but Congress could have easily cleared the
resulting debris of a gutted statute.306 After all, Congress would have
been free to rewrite the statute or enact an entirely new policy. 307 The
judiciary was not the only branch (read: it was not even the right branch)
to rewrite this language.308 This Article contends, in accordance with
Justice Scalia’s dissent, that the Supreme Court ought not to take
unwarranted statutory interpretation upon itself when the Justices lose
their faith in a democratic system.309
Congress may have intended to provide incentives to states through subsidies, but these incentives
were not powerful enough).
302. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494; Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 26.
303. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2494; Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 26.
304. David French, King v. Burwell: An Embarrassing Decision, NAT. REV. (June 25, 2015,
2:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420315/king-v-burwell-embarrassing-decisiondavid-french (“[Chief Justice Roberts] does not . . . know whether insurance markets would be
destabilized because he does not know the congressional response to a contrary ruling. He distrusts
Congress, so he’s going to ‘fix’ their mess.”).
305. Id. (“[A] Supreme Court decision applying the clear language of the statute wouldn’t have
mandated any particular congressional or presidential reaction. Congress would have been free to
reform Obamacare, rewrite it to include federal exchanges in the subsidy scheme, or enact entirely
new policies.”).
306. See id. (describing the ease of the process in which Congress could have corrected the
ACA to be more clear).
307. See id. (explaining that Congress could have reformed, rewritten, or enacted completely
new policies to fix the ACA instead of leaving it to the judiciary’s wrongful determination).
308. Id. (“The Supreme Court rewrites the Obamacare law instead of letting Congress do its
job.”).
309. Id. (“The Supreme Court, however, decided not to take any chances on democracy, so—
in an opinion long on insurance-economics analysis and short on statutory or constitutional
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Interestingly enough, the D.C. Circuit Court in Halbig found that the
ACA “unambiguously restrict[ed]” the tax credits to those who purchased
health insurance in a state-run Exchange, yet the King court did away
with this.310 The King Court went in a different direction and did not
target the IRS like the circuit court did in Halbig, but rather re-interpreted
the law to apply more broadly.311
The majority seemed to ignore the idea that Congress wanted to
incentivize states to create their own Exchanges.312 In referring back to
the reasoning in Sebelius, one is reminded that the Constitution does not
allow the federal government to effectively order states around.313 There
is somewhat of an exception, though, as the federal government can
provide incentives to states to entice them into opting in to a federal
program.314 Congress wanted states to feel some sort of external pressure
to establish insurance Exchanges on their own.315 Failing to establish an
Exchange deprives state residents of millions of federal dollars in
subsidies.316 One would think this would be enough to persuade states
into fulfilling the goal Congress envisioned.317 This makes it appear that
Congress had the foresight to know that if subsidies were available on
both state and federal Exchanges, there would be no incentive for states
to act without Congress’s direct command.318 With no incentive, states
reasoning—it effectively changed the statute. Why? Because of the entirely speculative real-world
effects.”).
310. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
311. Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 15, at 10.
312. See Hatch, supra note 250, at 9 (“But there is good reason to believe Congress did intend
to deny subsidies for federally enrolled plans, and not just because that’s what the statute says. The
reason is that Congress needed a way to incentivize the states to create their own [E]xchanges.”).
313. See supra notes 26–41 and accompanying text; see also Hatch, supra note 250, at 9
(explaining how the anticommandeering principle prevents the federal government from
commanding states to do something).
314. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (challenging
the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate provision). See also Howe, supra note 38
(illustrating the possible repercussions if the individual mandate was struck down in Sebelius).
315. Hatch, supra note 250, at 9.
316. See Tony Pugh, Money and Quality of Life at Stake as Health Law Returns to Supreme
Court, STATE (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.thestate.com/incoming/article13734041.html
(describing the projected 2016 impact of the petitioners’ victory in King).
317. Hatch, supra note 250, at 9.
318. See id. at 10 (“If you give unconditional subsidies, then . . . there is absolutely no incentive
for States to do it, and you have fundamentally undermined that distinct statutory purpose.”
(quoting Michael A. Carvin, counsel for the petitioners)). Moreover, without this incentive, the
ACA becomes a “federally run healthcare market,” which makes the ACA hugely unappealing to
many Republicans whose votes were needed to pass the legislation. This, also, may only be a
temporary success for the ACA, because as a result of the 2016 elections, the Republicans have
retained control of Congress, specifically in the House of Representatives.
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are more likely to “sit back” and let the Secretary establish the Exchanges
for them.319 Moreover, without this incentive, the ACA becomes a
“federally run healthcare market,” which makes the ACA very
unappealing to many Republicans whose votes were needed to pass this
legislation.320 This, also, may only be a temporary success for the ACA,
as the Republicans now have control of Congress and have regained the
house.321
The Supreme Court’s actions destroyed the structure of incentives
initially intended by Congress.322 During financial hardships, not
creating an Exchange could be very appealing, especially given the lack
of repercussions if the federal government has the funds to do what states
do not feel is affordable.323 It is clear why states would be reluctant to
take action under the Court majority’s interpretation of the statute, but
this interpretation runs contrary to Congress’s original intent.
Is this too much pressure, though? In oral arguments, Justice Anthony
Kennedy thought incentivizing states with that much money at stake was
putting an unconstitutional amount of pressure on states to conform to a
federal program.324 Justice Kennedy read the petitioners’ argument as,
“either create your own Exchange, or we’ll send your insurance market
into a death spiral.”325 But the solicitor general pointed out that, if this
were rising to the level of unconstitutional, then the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance would come in to play.326 According to this
doctrine, a federal court (i.e., the Supreme Court) ought to refuse to rule
on a constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.327 This also only applies, however, when the statute
319. See id. at 10.
320. See id.; see also Carrie Budoff Brown, Nelson: National Exchange a Dealbreaker,
POLITICO
(Jan.
25,
2010,
7:59
PM),
http://www.politico.com/livepulse/0110/Nelson_National_exchange_a_dealbreaker.html (noting
that Senator Ben Nelson stated he would oppose any health care reform bill with a national
insurance exchange); Patrick O’Connor & Carrie Budoff Brown, Nancy Pelosi’s Uphill Health Bill
Battle, POLITICO (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:43 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31294.html
(“Speaker Nancy Pelosi is telling her caucus not to believe stories that the House will simply roll
over and accept the Senate’s hard-fought health bill.”).
321. Howe, supra note 31.
322. Hatch, supra note 250, at 10.
323. Id. See, e.g., State Budget Shortfalls, SFY2013, HENRY J. KAISER. FAM. FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/state-budget-shortfalls-sfy13 (last updated June 27, 2012)
(discussing shortfalls or budget gaps in the state budget).
324. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 195, at 15, 37.
325. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 188, at 16 (statement of Justice Kennedy).
326. Id. at 49–50 (statement of Donald B. Verrilli).
327. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); see also Ex Parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11, 558).
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is ambiguous.328 Therefore, even if this kind of coercion were to be
deemed “too much,” it is still not an issue for the judiciary to decide.329
IV. IMPACT
While the actions of the Supreme Court might be viewed as
progressive, it is certainly not in line with a democracy.330 Justice
Scalia’s dissent pointed out how easily the Court will preserve, protect,
and rewrite the law—a practice that some view elevates the nation to a
federal technocracy.331 The Court set a risky precedent by “adding”
language to the ACA, and it is now effectively allowing lower courts to
do the same by citing back to the reasoning in King. Additionally, an
even scarier idea is that this case was not even about the ACA at all—
rather, it was about what the states have a right to do, or not to do.332
King was decided by all nine of the Supreme Court Justices. Chief
Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, joined by Justices
Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor,
and Elena Kagan. Justice Scalia wrote a twenty-one page, scathing
dissent, that was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.
While a decision in favor of the respondents would likely still have
resulted even if the case had been decided today—without Justice Scalia
on the bench—his biting dissent is properly credited with shedding so
much public light on the issues in King.333
The public first read that this was a “big win” for the ACA, and
rejoiced in the notion that the ACA was here to stay. 334 But what really
328. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2011) (“[T]he
canon of constitutional avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.”); see
also Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 188, at 17.
329. Hatch, supra note 250, at 13.
330. French, supra note 304.
331. Id.
332. See Abbe R. Gluck, King v. Burwell Isn’t About Obamacare, POLITICO (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/king-v-burwell-states-rights-115550.html
(stating that $25 billion in subsidies were at stake in King); see also Blumberg et al., supra note
284, at 1 (“[V]ictory for the plaintiff would . . . eliminate $28.8 billion in tax credits and costsharing reductions in 2016 . . . . ”). See also Michael Rosman, Symposium: King v. Burwell and
the
Plain
Meaning
Rule,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov.
11,
2014
10:25
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/symposium-king-v-burwell-and-the-plain-meaning-rule/
(“So King v. Burwell may not be quite as consequential for public policy as many would have us
believe. It can, though, be quite important for the development of the law . . . .”).
333. John Daniel Davidson, The Media Doesn’t Want Americans to Know Anything About King
v. Burwell, FEDERALIST (June 18, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/06/18/the-media-doesntwant-americans-to-know-anything-about-king-v-burwell/ (explaining how little Americans knew
about King v. Burwell before the Supreme Court reached its decision).
334. Paige Lavender, See How People Outside the Supreme Court Reacted to the King v.
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went viral was the (admittedly) outrageous language in Justice Scalia’s
dissent.335 It was language that could be understood, or identified with,
on many socioeconomic levels—a law degree is not necessary to
understand that there was outrage over some big issue.336 Justice Scalia’s
claim that “[w]ords no longer have meaning” is clear and powerful, and
begged a closer examination of the process used by the majority to decide
King.337 His dissent sparked conversation in social media regarding his
unusual and sarcastic phrasing, and fostered discussion by many who
may never have noticed the case’s outcome, and meaning, to begin with.
The reasoning and the holding of King continue to be revisited due, in
large part, to the shocking and persuasive arguments made by the late
Justice Scalia.
Justice Scalia was concerned that public respect for the courts might
dissolve if judges are viewed as making (instead of interpreting) law,
thereby impairing the Court’s ability to protect individual rights. 338 In
King, the Supreme Court did exactly this: it rewrote a portion of the ACA
by adding two words that drastically changed the scope of whose
healthcare insurance could be subsidized.339
It is peculiar that, of the roughly two thousand pages of the ACA, the
Supreme Court zoned in on the alleged ambiguity of just four words:
established by the state.340 This action lends itself to be interpreted as a
case about federalism and state power, not about the ACA.341 States had
the option to create Exchanges, and their resident purchasers would have
subsequently received subsidized tax credits.342 But the Court’s distrust
Burwell
Decision,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
25,
2015
1:04
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/25/supreme-court-obamacare-photos_n_7663324.html
(showing the “running of the interns” as the decision was released and celebrations ensued).
335. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Tiffany
Bates & Elizabeth Slattery, Top 9 Quotes from Justice Scalia’s Scathing Dissent in King v. Burwell,
THE DAILY SIGNAL (June 25, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/25/top-9-quotes-from-scaliasscathing-dissent-in-king-v-burwell/.
336. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
337. Id.
338. See Popkin, supra note 59, at 1187 (highlighting Justice Scalia’s commitment to a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation).
339. Id.
340. See Gluck, supra note 332 (“The challengers have seized on four words in this 2,000-page
law that, they contend, contain a dramatic consequence for the 34 states that have made this choice
and allowed the federal government to step in: the loss of critical insurance subsidies that makes
health insurance affordable and sustain the insurance markets under the law.”).
341. Federalism is about the role of states in the United States; and Congress enacted this
legislation as a way to defer to states to decide what to do. Id.
342. See id. (“The ACA gives the states the opportunity to run these insurance markets, but
provides a federal fallback.”).
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of states’ abilities, or even desires, to enact these Exchanges to provide
their residents with federally subsidized healthcare is apparent.343
Congress enacted the ACA to give states the option to opt in or opt out
of its nationwide healthcare program.344 This program has been
compared to what was implemented through the Clean Air Act,345 which
provides for a federal “fallback” if states do not cooperate with the way
Congress initially foresaw (i.e., where the federal government would
effectively “step in” in place of a state’s inaction).346
Congress was explicit in its “take it or leave it” language in the
ACA.347 It also appears that Congress anticipated a multitude of
outcomes, and provided for these variations in the statutory language of
the ACA.348 This is the most that society can expect from a legislative
body: to prepare for as much as possible.349 It sends a conflicting
message to the public when the judiciary claims that congressional
“fallbacks” are insufficient.350
Continuing with the idea of a dangerous precedent, it is important to
remember that it was the IRS that initially caused havoc in the
interpretation of who is eligible to receive subsidies.351 The IRS allowed
subsidies to go to those who purchased health insurance through a
federally established Exchange in the state in which he or she resided. It
was this key IRS provision that ran counter to the very clear words in the
ACA. The decision in King not only sets a precedent that language can,
essentially, be added to legislation by the Supreme Court, but it also
effectively condones a regulatory agency like the IRS to fix something
that is not broken.352

343. See id. (“Just as the challengers urge an over-simplistic reading of the statutory text, [the
court] have dramatically oversimplified how Congress approaches the states in the statute, masking
the state-deferential way in which the ACA actually addresses the insurance [E]xchanges.”).
344. See id. (“The issue in King is whether the ACA penalizes states that opt out of setting up
their own health insurance [E]xchanges and, instead, let the federal government do it for them.”).
345. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970); see also Summary of the Clean Air Act,
EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act (last visited Nov. 7, 2015)
(summarizing the Clear Air Act).
346. Gluck, supra note 332.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See Busler, supra note 4 (describing how legal solutions are often found in precedent and
analogy, but King implies that clear language can be ignored in the name of intent, making the legal
language irrelevant to a court who has other goals in mind).
352. Logan Albright, Top Five Misconceptions about King v. Burwell, FREEDOMWORKS (June
22, 2015), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/top-five-misconceptions-about-king-v-burwell
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Many Americans are also under the unfortunate misconception that
these Exchanges, whether federally or state-established, are running
smoothly and efficiently.353 King represents the third attack on the ACA,
and it is impressive that it has withstood these challenges for this long. 354
The ACA is not achieving all that was planned, though, and going with it
are the online insurance Exchanges.355 Less people are enrolling, and
HHS has reported an enrollment rate of half of what it expected.356
Insurance companies are not taking in enough revenue to afford all of the
Americans who are now mandated by law to seek coverage.357
In light of a discussion on a dangerous precedent, King has already
been used as authority to add language to legislation. The Second Circuit,
in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, faced its own interpretation issue.358 In
Berman, the statutory provision contained the phrase “provide . . . to the
Commission,” and there was a question of what this literally meant, and
whether it applies to other provisions in the statute.359 The Second
Circuit cited to King when it gave Chevron deference to a definition
coined by the agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”).360 In King, however, the IRS lacked sufficient expertise to
contradict the ACA provision, but the agency (the SEC) in Berman was

(“[This] case will decide whether it is okay for a regulatory agency—the IRS—to effectively
rewrite a law based on its own interpretation of the language. This could set a very dangerous
precedent for future cases, if the Court rules in favor of the administration.”).
353. See id. (“Many of ObamaCare’s defenders have assumed that if the Court rules to maintain
the subsidies, everything will just go on as usual and there will be no problem.”).
354. Id.; see also Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Now, the Third Leg of the Health-Care
Stool, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 1, 2015, 12:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/argumentpreview-now-the-third-leg-of-the-health-care-stool/ (“That third leg was so important to the entire
enterprise, it seemed, that the Supreme Court agreed to rule on its legality even when there was
then no split among lower courts on that question. One might suggest that at least some of the
Justices were eager to confront the issue.”).
355. See Albright, supra note 352 (explaining the destruction of the Exchanges).
356. See Philip Klein, Obamacare’s Big Question Mark, WASH. EXAMINER (June 4, 2015, 1:03
PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/obamacares-big-question-mark/article/2565614 (“But
as of now, HHS says that just 10.2 million signed up and paid premiums (which only met HHS’s
downwardly revised target).”); see also Logan Albright, Regardless of Court’s Decision,
ObamaCare
Is
Falling
Apart,
FREEDOMWORKS
(June
8,
2015),
http://www.freedomworks.org/content/regardless-courts-decision-obamacare-falling-apart (“The
fact of the matter is that ObamaCare is so badly broken that no amount of subsidies will be able to
keep it afloat forever.”).
357. Albright, supra note 352 (asserting that it is only a matter of time before the states cannot
afford to continue on with the ACA).
358. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2015).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 155.
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of sufficient knowledge and skill to make the calls that it did. 361 The
Second Circuit even recognized that it did not need to resolve any alleged
ambiguity like King, but will resort to the interpretive rule adopted by the
appropriate agency.362 But the fact that the Court in Berman considered
“provide . . . to the Commission” as an ambiguity is a problem.
Additionally, in September 2015, the Third Circuit stated that the
starting point for all statutory interpretation and construction is the text
of the statute.363 While this is true, and agreed upon generally, the court
then went on to use King as an example of how to proceed when the text
is ambiguous.364
Law has a fluid nature of justice. It instills faith in rising lawyers that
they will, one day, have the tools to argue fairly and intelligently for the
sake of justice. The area of law is grey—constantly having to adapt to
advancing technologies and changing circumstances. But there is a great
risk in losing faith in the very texts that are intended to guide citizens’
conduct, especially if these guidelines can be changed and interpreted as
drastically as they were in King. Upholding the ACA is a fantastic
outcome for the sake of the millions of American citizens that purchased
affordable health insurance through a federally established Exchange, but
the manner in which this was decided is inherently problematic. If
“established by the State” can have another meaning besides the one so
clearly written, this sets a dangerous precedent for textual interpretation
and application in the future.365
CONCLUSION
To echo the above, King had an arguably good outcome, but it came at
a cost. The typical separation of powers approach was substituted for an
illustration of the supreme power of the highest court.
It is difficult to see, now, how exactly King will affect textual
commitment, or the lack thereof, moving forward. It is clear, though, that
the majority of the Supreme Court Justices are in favor of keeping the
ACA, and it is unfortunate that they went about keeping it through
displaying such a grave disregard for plain textual interpretation. Despite
the dramatizations in Justice Scalia’s dissent, his points were wellfounded and served to unveil that the judiciary has no problem exercising
its broad powers. We now have cases that are calling such clear language

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id.
Id.
G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 611 (3rd Cir. 2015).
Id. at 618.
Id.
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like “established by the State” an ambiguity, which is a significant
problem in legislative interpretation that will be faced by future courts.
The Supreme Court rewrote the law to conform to the Executive’s vision
of healthcare, and it effectively swept the rug out from under the powers
inherent in Congress. This decision showed just how powerful the
Supreme Court can be—and currently is—and how consistent judicial
interpretation can take a backseat when coined “important policy issues,”
like healthcare, are on the line.

